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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Constitution establishes that Congress shall have the
power "To Promote the Progress of Science ... by securing for
limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their ... Writ-
ings."' The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted "writings" to mean
the "physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or
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1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
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aesthetic labor..' Unlike the original 1909 Copyright Act, the present
statute does not encompass all "writings" of authors.' Rather, the
1976 Copyright Act (1976 Act) uses the phrase "works of authorship"
instead of "writings."4 This change in phraseology was intended to
clarify the congressional intent not to extend protection to the outer
limits of the constitutional grant.5 Simply stated, all works of
authorship are writings but not all writings are works of authorship.
The present law does not protect as much subject matter as the
constitutional grant could permit.
In accordance with the Constitution's reference to "authors," the
1976 Act provides that the initial ownership of copyright belongs to
a work's author. Much recent scholarship has concentrated on the
2. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
3. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1994)) [hereinafter 1976 Act). Section 4 of the 1909 Copyright Act provided:
"[Tihe works for which copyright may be secured under this Act shall include all the writings
of an author." Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075 (hereinafter 1909 Act], repealed by
1976 Act, supra.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
5. H.R. REP. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.AN. 5659,
5664 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1476]. Although the 1909 Act protected "all the writings of an
author," 1909 Act, supra note 3, § 4, the 1976 Act provides that "[c]opyright protection subsists
... in original works of authorship. " 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). This particular provision received a
great deal of attention during the legislative process. In conjunction with the 1976 Act, the 94th
Congress issued what has come to be known as the House Report. H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 47.
The House Report consists of commentary designed to assist in the interpretation of the 1976
Act. Id The House Report explains the use of the phrase "original works of authorship" as
follows:
In using the phrase "original works of authorship," rather than "all the writings of an
author" now in § 4 of the statute, the committee's purpose is to avoid exhausting the
constitutional power of Congress to legislate in this field, and to eliminate the
uncertainties arising from the latter phrase. Since the present statutory language is
substantially the same as the empowering language of the Constitution, a recurring
question has been whether the statutory and constitutional provisions are coextensive.
If so, the courts would be faced with the alternative of holding copyrightable
something that Congress clearly did not intend to protect, or of holding constitution-
ally incapable of copyright something that Congress might one day want to protect.
To avoid these equally undesirable results, the courts have indicated that "all the
writings of an author" under the present statute is narrower in scope than the
"writings" of "authors" referred to in the Constitution. The bill avoids this dilemma
by using a different phrase--"original works of authorship"--in characterizing the
general subject matter of statutory copyright protection.
H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 5664, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5664.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994). The legislative history explains why initial ownership vests
in the author:.
[What we must impress on Congress, or those Congressmen who are not aware of it,
is that what they are being asked to do, and what they have done in the 1909 Act, and
in every copyright act, is to say that one creator of property and the creator or the
possessor of that property (who I think has the greatest claim of all, because it isn't a
claim based on finding something, or buying something, or inheriting something, or
swindling somebody out of something- he created it; it's not even like a patent where
he found something that somebody else might have found; he created something that
nobody else in the world could have created, and but for him wouldn't have exist-
1996] DEFINING "AUTHOR" FOR PURPOSES OF COPYRIGHT 1325
historical development of "the author" and the question of whether
authors should have the right-natural or otherwise-to control their
works.7 Still others have examined the scope of the rights afforded
to an author.' One scholar has even remarked that "[t]he author has
been under siege in the United States."9  Another distinguished
authority on copyright law paints a picture of authors as strange
personages who shun their own work in favor of self-indulgence and
sloth:
The biographies of authors show that they are more subject than
most men to indolence. It is pleasanter to satisfy their active minds
with conversation and observation and random reflections than to
sit for many lonely hours at a table and push a pen. They must
somehow be blasted out of this agreeable aimlessness, and one of
the best ways is the hope of providing a competence for their
children.'0
ed)-you're saying to a Congressman, "this really doesn't belong to him." Well,
nothing belongs to anybody unless Congress, or a State legislature, or a court, says it
does.
Copyright Law Revision: Discussion and Comments on Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General
Revision of the U.S. Gopright Law, pt. 2, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. 92 (1963) (statement of Irwin Karp,
Counsel, Committee for Literary Studies), reprinted in 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION
LEciSLATIVE HISTORY, pt. 2, at 92 (1976) [hereinafter OMNIBUS].
7. See, eg.,James DA Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 AM.
U. L. R. 625,63243 (1988) (discussing history of term "authorship") [hereinafter Boyle, Search
for an Author]; James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and
Insider Trading, 80 CAL L. REv. 1413, 1461-70 (1992) (describing use of word "authorship" in
context of copyright law) [hereinafter Boyle, Theory of Law]; Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect:
Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, 10 CARnozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 297-305 (1992)
(examining meaning of term "authorship"); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright
as Labor and Possion, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 517, 518-19 (1990) (discussing authors' incentives to
create new works). See generally MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF
COPYRIGHT (1993) (reviewing development of copyright and authorship); DAVID SAUNDERS,
AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT (1992) (reviewing historical treatment of term "authorship" in
copyright law). As to why "authors" should control rights in works, see BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN
UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 8 (1967). Professor Kaplan states:
There is an apparent tracing of rights to the ultimate source in the fact of authorship,
but before attaching large importance to this we have to note that if printing as a trade
was not to be put back into the hands of a few as a subject of monopoly-if the statute
was indeed to be a kind of "universal patent"-a draftsman would naturally be led to
express himself in terms of rights in books and hence of initial rights in authors.
Id.
8. See, e.g., Barbara Friedman, From Deontology to Dialogue: The Cultural Consequences of
Copyight, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 157,157-85 (1994)- (reviewing historical justifications for
granting copyright protections to authors); Marci A. Hamilton, Appropriation Art and the Imminent
Decline in Authorial Control over Copyrighted Works, 42J. COPYRIGHT Soc' 93 (1994) (noting that
definition of "author" affects amount of control author has over work); Yen, supra note 7, at 554-
57 (advocating natural law copyright theory).
9. Hamilton, supra note 8, at 125.
10. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 508
(1945).
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Instead of entering these debates, this Article asks a different
question: Who is an author? In other words, what does a person
have to do in order to be characterized as an "author" for purposes
of copyright? This seemingly simple question is actually complex.
The Supreme Court has defined the word "author" twice; but only in
dicta." This Article examines the definition of "author."
Parts I and II review the contemporary majority and minority case
law definitions of "author." By examining the language of the 1976
Act and its legislative history, case law under prior copyright statutes,
the legislative history of the 1909 Copyright Act (1909 Act), and
evidence from eighteenth century definitions, these parts attempt to
hypothesize what the Framers meant when they referred to "authors"
in the Constitution. Part III proposes a definition of "author" that is
different from the one currently recognized by the federal judiciary.
I. THE CONTEMPORARY DEFINITION: MAJORITY VIEW
Generally speaking, contemporary cases that have defined "author"
for purposes of copyright have focused their inquiry on one basic
question: Has the putative author produced something that is
copyrightable? 2 There are two versions of what is really the same
"rule" of copyright law that have led courts to ask this question. One
version of the "rule" comes from Justice Thurgood Marshall's
statement in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid:" "As a
general rule, the author is the party who actually creates the work,
that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible
expression entitled to copyright protection."14 The other version of
the "rule" comes from the discussion ofjoint authorship in Professor
Goldstein's treatise on copyright law: "A collaborative contribution
will not produce a joint work, and a contributor will not obtain a
co-ownership interest, unless the contribution represents original
expression that could stand on its own as the subject matter of
copyright."15 Thus, according to Professor Goldstein, in order to be
11. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) ("As a general
rule, the author is the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an
idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection." (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102
(1994)); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53,58 (1884) ("An author ... is 'he
to whom anything owes its origin; originator, maker.. '").
12. See infra note 18 (noting decisions considering meaning of term "authorship").
13. 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
14. Reid, 490 U.S. at 737 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102).
15. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRAcTICE § 4.2.1.2, at 379 (1989).
It is not surprising that many cases that have examined the definition of "author" have done so
in the context ofjoint authorship. Courts also frequently have construed Professor Goldstein's
rule in the context ofjoint authorship. See infra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing
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an "author," one must contribute something that is independently
copyrightable. Taken together, courts have used these two versions
to forge the rule that a person must fix his idea in a tangible medium
of expression in order to be considered an "author" under the 1976
Act.16 This Article refers to this hybrid rule as the "Marshall-
Goldstein" rule.
The Marshall-Goldstein approach has a certain logical appeal. The
1976 Act could not be clearer: "Copyright protection subsists... in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device.""7 In order to be copyright-
able-that is, subject to copyright protection-a work must be fixed in
a tangible medium. Because a work cannot be copyrightable unless
it is fixed, it stands to reason that a person cannot be considered an
author for purposes of copyright unless he has fixed his work in a
tangible medium. The cases so holding are legion." Judge after
judge who has considered this issue has cited with approval Justice
Marshall and/or Professor Goldstein, and has held that being an
author depends upon whether one has fixed something in a tangible
medium. 9 Childress v. Taylor," typical of these cases, may be the
disputes in context of joint authorship).
16. See infra note 18 (listing decisions that have considered authorship aspect of copyright
law).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
18. See, e.g., Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1071 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting
that person who fixes ideas in tangible expression qualifies.as author); Childress v. Taylor, 945
F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991) (remarking that expression must be fixed before creator is
considered author); Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting
general rule that person must translate ideas into copyrightable expression to be considered
author); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1493 (11th Cir. 1990)
(noting authorship requirement applies to joint authors); Riley Home Bldg. Corp. v. Cosgrove,
864 F. Supp. 1034, 1037 (D. Fan. 1994) (stating that copyright ownership vests only in person
who creates fixed, tangible expression); Balkin v. Wilson, 863 F. Supp. 523, 527-28 (W.D. Mich.
1994) (discussing requirement that one must fix idea into tangible form to be author); Whelan
Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1318-19 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (analyzing
requirements forjoint authorship), affid, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denie, 479 U.S. 1031
(1987); Kenbrooke Fabrics, Inc. v. Material Things, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1039,1044-45 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (discussing authorship requirement in terms of work for hire); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman,
Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 259 (D. Neb. 1982) (describing joint
authorship requirements); Meltzerv. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847,857 (D.NJ. 1981) (remarking that
work is not created until it is fixed in tangible form); see also Edward Valachovic, The Contribution
Requirement to a Joint Work Under the Copyright Act, 12 Loy. L-. ENT. LJ. 199, 199 (1992)
("Recently, courts have found it more expeditious to dismiss a claim of joint authorship by
applying the bright-line rule of 'copyrightability' to each putative author's contribution .... "
(footnote omitted)).
19. See supra note 18 (listing decisions that have considered authorship aspect of copyright
law).
20. 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991).
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best known. Thus, it serves as a valuable first illustration of the
contemporary majority definition of "author."
In Childress, Clarce Taylor, an actress who had built a reputation by
impersonating the black entertainer "Moms" Mabley, approached the
plaintiff, Alice Childress, a playwright, and convinced Childress to
write a play about the life of "Moms" Mabley.2' Taylor researched
Mabley and provided her research to Childress.2" Subsequently,
Childress asked Taylor for additional biographical investigation and
then routinely consulted with Taylor as the writing of the play
evolved.' During this process, Taylor recommended detailed scenes,
jokes, and characters for the play.24 According to the Second
Circuit, "Taylor contributed facts and details about 'Moms' Mabley's
life and discussed some of them with Childress. However, Childress
was responsible for the actual structure of the play and the dia-
logue."' The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for
Childress on the basis that the intent necessary for joint authorship
was lacking.26 The 1976 Act defines a "joint work" as "a work
prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of
a unitary whole."27 Thus, in order to be considered "joint authors,"
the putative joint authors must manifest this intention."
Nevertheless, the court also addressed the definition of "author" in
dicta, a sensible strategy.29 After all, "[b]y definition the party
raising the joint authorship claim (or defense) must be an 'author' of





26. Id. at 507-08.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
28. Childress, 945 F.2d at 507. Judge Newman interpreted this statutory requirement of
intent in a curious manner. According to judge Newman, "What distinguishes the writer-editor
relationship and the writer-researcher relationship from the truejoint author relationship is the
lack of intent of both participants in the venture to regard themselves as joint authors." Id.
(emphasis added). Judge Newman clarified his interpretation of the "joint work" intent
requirement as follows:
Focusing on whether the putative joint authors regarded themselves as joint authors
is especially important in circumstances, such as the instant case, where one person
(Childress) is indisputably the dominant author of the work and the only issue is
whether that person is the sole author or she and another (Taylor) are joint authors.
Id. at 508 (citations omitted).
This interpretation is different from what the language of the statute actually says. The
statute does not say that the putative authors must intend to be "joint authors." It says that they
must intend to merge their contributions into either inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
29. Childress, 945 F.2d at 506 (noting that person who creates work is author regardless of
whether work is copyrightable).
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the copyrightable work."30 The Childress decision recognized that the
authorship question in the context ofjoint authorship is particularly
sensitive and difficult:
Care must be taken to ensure that true collaborators in the creative
process are accorded the perquisites of co-authorship and to guard
against the risk that a sole author is denied exclusive authorship
status simply because another person rendered some form of
assistance. Copyright law best serves the interests of creativity when
it carefully draws the bounds of 'Joint authorship" so as to protect
the legitimate claims of both sole authors and co-authors.
Judge Newman noted pointedly that "[a] more substantial issue
arising under the statutory definition of 'joint work' is whether the
contribution of each joint author must be copyrightable or only the
combined result of theirjoint efforts must be copyrightable."32 After
acknowledging the competing views of Professors Nimmer 3 and
Goldstein," Judge Newman noted, "The case law supports a require-
ment of copyrightability of each contribution."" Therefore, on one
level, Childress establishes that in order to be considered an "author,"
one must contribute something that is copyrightable. The Seventh
Circuit adopted this position in a case which provides another good
example of the contemporary approach to defining "author," Erickson
v. Trinity Theatre, Inc.
36
Erickson involved a claim ofjoint authorship by a theater perform-
ing the plays of a playwright.3 7 Although playwright Karen Erickson
30. Respect Inc. v. Committee on the Status of Women, 815 F. Supp. 1112, 1120 (N.D. Ill.
1993).
31. Childress, 945 F.2d at 504.
32. Id. at 506.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 62-69 (discussing Professor Nimmer's view that each
author's contribution need not be copyrightable itself to have joint work).
34. See Goldstein, supra note 15 (concluding that joint work is only produced when each
author contributes some expression that itself would be copyrightable).
35. Childress, 945 F.2d at 506.
36. 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994).
37. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994). The playwright, Karen
Erickson, sued the Trinity Theatre, requesting that it be enjoined from performing her plays.
Id. at 1065. The Trinity Theatre responded that it was a joint author by virtue of the
contributions ofits actors. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definingjoint work as that"prepared
by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable
or interdependent parts of a unitary whole"). See general/y MARSHALL LEAFFER UNDERSTANDING
COPYRIGHT LAW § 5.2, at 148-55 (2d ed. 1995). The court in Erkkson explained why the claim
ofjoint authorship by Trinity Theatre was an important aspect of the case:
In a joint work, the joint authors hold undivided interests in a work, despite any
differences in each author's contribution. Each author as co-owner has the right to
use or to license the use of the work, subject to an accounting to the other co-owners
for any profits. Thus, even a person whose contribution is relatively minor, if accorded
joint authorship status, enjoys a significant benefit.
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was the sole writer of the plays in question, the Trinity Theatre argued
that its actors had contributed a great deal to the finished products
and, therefore, it should be deemed a joint author.'
The circumstances in Childress and the circumstances surrounding
the development of Much Ado and Prairie Voices [two of the plays at
issue in the case] are very similar. Here, the actors provided
suggestions and contributed ideas; their contributions merely arose
from a different process than in Childress. Indeed, Taylor presented
a somewhat stronger case. She was able to identify specific material
attributable to her. Trinity actors, with one exception, were unable
to identify specific contributions they had made. 9
The court postulated that "[e]ven if two or more persons collabo-
rate with the intent to create a unitary work, the product will be
considered a joint work' only if the collaborators can be considered
'authors.'""0 The court analyzed the Nimmer and Goldstein ap-
proaches to defining an "author" for purposes of joint works, and
concluded, like the court in Childress, that Professor Goldstein's
copyrightability method was preferable.4' The court emphasized that
the 1976 Act dictates that a 'joint work" be "prepared by two or more
Eickson, 13 F.3d at 1068 (citation omitted); see also infra note 59 and accompanying text (noting
cases that held thatjoint work requires each author to contribute something copyrightable on
its own).
38. Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1065.
39. Id. at 1072.
40. Id. at 1068 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 1069-70. The court in Erickson stated that the copyrightability approach fosters
certain policy goals of copyright law-
The copyrightability test advances creativity in science and art by allowing for the
unhindered exchange of ideas, and protects authorship rights in a consistent and
predictable manner. It excludes contributions such as ideas which are not protected
under the Copyright Act. This test also enables parties to predict whether their
contributions to a work will entitle them to copyright protection as a joint author.
Compared to the uncertain exercise of divining whether a contribution is more than
de minimis, reliance on the copyrightability of an author's proposed contribution yields
relatively certain answers. The copyrightability standard allows contributors to avoid
post-contribution disputes concerning authorship, and to protect themselves by
contract if it appears that they would not enjoy the benefits accorded to authors of
joint works under the Act
We agree with the Childress court's observation that the copyrightability test "strikes
an appropriate balance in the domains of both copyright and contract law." Section
201(b) of the Act allows any person to contract with another to create a work and
endow the employer with authorship status under the Act. A contributor of
uncopyrightable ideas may also protect her rights to compensation under the Act by
contract. Section 201(d) of the Act provides in part that any of the exclusive
ownership rights comprised in a copyright may be transferred from the person who
satisfied the requirements for obtaining the copyright to one who contracts for such
rights. Thus, anyone who contributes to the creation of a work, either as patron,
employer, or contributor of ideas, has the opportunity to share in the profits produced
by the work through an appropriate contractual arrangement.
Id. at 1071 (quoting Childress, 945 F.2d at 507) (citations omitted).
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authors."42 And the court then quoted Justice Marshall's dictum in
Reid, stating, "An author is 'the party who actually creates the work,
that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible
expression entitled to copyright protection."'48 The court then
latched onto the phrase "fixed, tangible expression" and quoted the
Copyright Act's definition of "fixed.""
As to the requirement of fixation, § 101 states that "[a] work is
'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in
a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration."" The Erickson court concluded that "[to
qualify as an author, one must supply more than mere direction or
ideas."46" Applying these rules of law, the court determined that the
Trinity Theatre could not be a joint author: "In order for the plays
to be joint works under the Act, Trinity also must show that actors'
contributions to Ms. Erickson's work could have been independently
copyrighted."4' The court punctuated its decision with an almost
irrefutable maxim of copyright law: "Ideas, refinements, and sugges-
tions, standing alone, are not the subjects of copyrights."48
Both Childress and Erickson seem appealing. The basic copyright
doctrine they espouse is that an author is the person who creates a
copyrightable work. And, in order to be copyrightable, a work must
be "original" and "fixed" in a "tangible medium of expression. ""
Thus, if a putative author produces something that is not fixed-in
other words, something that is an intangible idea-he is not an
"author" for copyright purposes.
Although many cases prior to Childress and Erickson had champi-
oned this approach, two groups of cases (with facts similar to one
another) had firmly established this copyrightability requirement.
Meltzer v. Zoller,5° Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Mille, P.C. v. Empire
Construction Co.,5 and M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc. 2 are
42. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)).
43. 1& (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989)).
44. I.
45. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
46. I. (citing Red, 490 U.S. at 737).
47. I. at 1072.
48. I&
49. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
50. 520 F. Supp. 847, 857 (D.NJ. 1981) (holding that architectural firm was author for
copyright purposes).
51. 542 F. Supp. 252, 259 (D. Neb. 1982) (holding parties jointly and severally liable for
copyright infringement of architectural drawings).
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cases involving homeowners who drew sketches and made suggestions
for their architects. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc.,
53
S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc.,' and Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross5 are cases
where individuals provided a list of specifications and made sugges-
tions to a computer programmer. In both of these situations, the
outcomes are consistent. The architects and programmers successfully
argued that the parties who had provided only sketches, specifications,
and suggestions could not be considered "authors" because they had
contributed merely intangible ideas that were uncopyrightable.
5 6
The Ninth Circuit's holding in S.O.S. is representative of this
approach. The S.O.S. court, relying on Justice Marshall's dictum in
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,5" held that "[t] o be an
author, one must supply more than mere direction or ideas; one must
'translate[] an idea into a fixed tangible expression entitled to
copyright protection."'5 8
Thus, the contemporary, majority definition of "author" is clear,
because the majority of cases decided under the 1976 Act hold that
an author is someone who contributes something that is copyrightable
on its own.59 And the 1976 Act is clear that in order to be copyright-
able things must be "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. "'° Therefore, to be
an author for purposes of copyright law, one must fix his original
52. 903 F.2d 1486, 1492-93 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that house builder was not entitled
to copyright protection as author of floor plans).
53. 609 F. Supp..1307, 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (denying coauthorship to dental laboratory
submissions), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
54. 886 F.2d 1081, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that licensee employee was not
coauthor for merely informing author of information requirements).
55. 916 F.2d 516,521 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that author of user commands was notjoint
author and not entitled to copyright protection).
56. Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1990); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc.,
886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 609 F.
Supp. 1307, 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aft'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031
(1987).
57. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (notingJustice Marshall's seminal definition
of authorship in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)).
58. S.O.S., 886 F.2d at 1087 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 737).
59. See generally BancTraining Video Sys. v. First Am. Corp., 956 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1992);
Childress v, Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991); Ashton-Tate Corp., 916 F.2d at 521; S.O.S., 886
F.2d at 1086;Johannsen v. Brown, 797 F. Supp. 835, 842 (D. Or. 1992); Neva, Inc. v. Christian
Duplications Int'l, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1533 (M.D. Fla. 1990); Boggs v. Sapp, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1040
(E.D. Va. 1988); Whelan Assocs., 609 F. Supp. at 318-19; Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v.
Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 259 (D. Neb. 1982).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
1332
1996] DEFINING "AUTHOR" FOR PURPOSES OF COPYRIGHT
work in a tangible medium of expression; intangible ideas are not
enough.
Furthermore, as far as the definition of "author" is concerned, the
cases do not distinguish situations involving single authors from joint
authors. The criteria for being labeled "author" are apparently the
same. The issue is routinely litigated in the context ofjoint authors
because in this scenario it is most important to discriminate between
activities that qualify someone for status as an "author" versus status
as a "non-author" (i.e., someone who merely contributes non-
copyrightable elements-such as ideas-to the finished product). In
fact, the question of defining an author for purposes of copyright is
probably best resolved in the context of a joint authorship dispute
because, as a practical matter, the real question is whether one of the
parties can be characterized as an "author," and therefore entitled to
share the spoils with the other person claiming to be the author.
One commentator summarizes the crux of the dispute as follows:
Joint authorship is a central issue in determining whether an
accounting is actually due: if the party seeking an accounting is not
actually an author, he has no ownership interest in the work and is
entitled to nothing from the other party unless he can prove
ownership by some other means."
II. THE CONTEMPORARY DEFINITION: MINORY APPROACHES
The most well-known minority definition of authorship is Professor
Nimmer's de minimis approach. In Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., the
court summarized Nimmer's de minimis view on authorship as it
applies in a joint authorship setting:
Professor Nimmer, the late scholar on copyright, took the position
that all that should be required to achieve joint author status is
more than a de minimis contribution by each author. "De
minimis" requires that "more than a word or line must be added by
one who claims to be a joint author." Professor Nimmer distin-
guishes his de minimis standard from the standard for
copyrightability. As an example, Professor Nimmer asserts that if
two authors collaborate, with one contributing only uncopyrightable
plot ideas and another incorporating those ideas into a completed
literary expression, the two authors should be regarded as joint
61. Norbert F. Kugele, Note, How Much Does It Take.: Copyrightability as a Minimum Standard
forDeteminingJoint Authorship, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 809, 833 (arguing that courts should adopt
copyrightability standard most consistent with 1976 Act) (footnote omitted).
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authors of the resulting work. This position has not found support
in the courts.62
According to Nimmer, a person who contributes non-copyrightable
elements to a work-a work that ultimately attains copyrightable status
as a whole-should be considered ajoint author. 3 Under Nimmer's
view, a joint author shares equally in the benefits of initial copyright
ownership.'
Although most courts have rejected Professor Nimmer's de minimis
approach in favor of Professor Goldstein's copyrightability rule,6 a
few courts have either mentioned it without expressly rejecting it or
have actually approved of it. For example, Judge Ruth Bader
Ginsburg's D.C. Circuit Court opinion in Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid,"6 noted:
If Nimmer is correct on the point that the contribution of a joint
author need not be copyrightable 'standing alone,' even CCNV's
choice of the title 'Third World America' and the legend for the
pedestal... while not independently copyrightable... may count
along with other CCNV contributions, toward meeting the "more
than de minimis" threshold required for joint authorship.67
In addition to Judge Ginsburg's reference in Reid, two district courts
recently have adopted and applied Professor Nimmer's de minimis
62. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1069-70 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing 1 DAVID
NIMMER & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COFYRIGHT, § 6.07, at 6-20). Judge Ripple
continued his opinion by explaining why courts had chosen not to follow Professor Nimmer's
approach to joint authorship:
The lack of support in all likelihood stems from one of several weaknesses in Professor
Nimmer's approach. First, Professor Nimmer's test is not consistent with one of the
Act's premises: ideas and concepts standing alone should not receive protection.
Because the creative process necessarily involves the development of existing concepts
into new forms, any restriction on the free exchange of ideas stifles creativity to some
extent. Restrictions on an author's use of existing ideas in a work, such as the threat
that accepting suggestions from another party might jeopardize the author's sole
entitlement to a copyright, would hinder creativity. Second, contribution of an idea
is an exceedingly ambiguous concept. Professor Nimmer provides little guidance to
courts or parties regarding when a contribution rises to the level ofjoint authorship
except to state that the contribution must be "more than a word or a line."
Id at 1070 (quoting 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, § 6.07, at 6-20).
63. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 62, § 6.07, at 6-20 to 6-21.
64. See LzAFFER, supra note 37, at § 5.4[c] (discussing concept of joint authorship for
copyright purposes).
65. See Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1070.
66. 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aft'd, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
67. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1496 n.15 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (citations omitted), affid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
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rule: Words & Data, Inc. v. GTE Communications Services, Inc.'s and
Napoli v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.69
A few courts have marched to their own drummer. Occasionally a
court confronted with the need to define "author" has focused on
some criterion other than either the copyrightability of a putative
author's contribution (Goldstein-Marshall) or the significance of that
contribution (Nimmer). For example, in Respect Inc. v. Committee on
the Status of Women,7" the court remarked that a putative author's
contribution must be original in order for him to be an author.7'
Without explaining its conclusion, the court in Production Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co.72 had this to say about
"authorship":
When a football game is being covered by four television cameras,
with a director guiding the activities of the four cameramen and
choosing which of their electronic images are sent out to the public
68. 765 F. Supp. 570 (W.D. Mo. 1991). The court stated the rule of law as follows:
The respective contributions of authors to a single work do not need to be "equal
either quantitatively or qualitatively in order to constitute such contributors as joint
authors. It would seem, however, that each such contribution must, in any event, be
more than de minimis. That is, more than a word or a line must be added by one who
claims to be a joint author." Thus, although Words & Data intended to merge its
contribution with that of Sprint, joint authorship will not be found if Sprint's
contribution was de minimis.
Words & Data, Inc. v. GTE Communications Servs., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 570,575 (W.D. Mo. 1991)
(citations omitted) (quoting 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 62, § 6.03, at 6-8).
69. 835 F. Supp. 1053 (N.D. I1. 1993). The court framed its rule of law regardingjoint
authorship as follows:
[W]e must consider whether Sears' contributions ... were sufficient to make Sears a
joint author of the [computer] system, or at least sufficient to establish a genuine issue
as tojoint authorship .... In order to demonstratejoint authorship, the contributions
of the authors do not need to "be equal either quantitatively or qualitatively .... It
would seem, however, that each such contribution must, in any event, be more than
de minimis. That is more than a word or a line must be added by one who claims to
be ajoint author."
Napoli v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 835 F. Supp. 1053, 1059 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (citation omitted)
(quoting 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 62, § 6.07, at 6-18-2 (quoted in Words &Data)).
70. 815 F. Supp. 1112 (N.D. 11. 1993).
71. Respect Inc. v. Committee on the Status of Women, 815 F. Supp. 1112, 1120 (N.D. Ill.
1993). The court explained:
By definition the party raising the joint-authorship claim (or defense) must be an
"author" of the copyrightable work. Although the Act does not define "author," the
Supreme Court-distilling a definition from the constitutional use of the word in U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8-long has construed the term to mean "he to whom anything
owes its origin."
It necessarily follows (from both constitutional as well as statutory sources) that a
contributor must have contributed something original to be deemed an author for
purposes of the 1976 Act.
I& at 1120 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53,58 (1884)) (footnote
omitted).
72. 622 F. Supp. 1500 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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and in what order, there is little doubt that what the cameramen
and director are doing constitutes "authorship."
3
One case deserves special mention-Andrien v. Southern Ocean
County Chamber of Commerce.74 In Andtien, the Third Circuit consid-
ered the authorship claim ofJames Andrien, a real estate agent, who
prepared a map, using as its basis other pre-existing maps and his
"own personal survey" of "civic landmarks, fishing sites and previously
unlisted street names."'5 Andrien then "determined the scale to be
used on the finished map by driving his automobile between
intersecting streets and measuring the distance on [his car's]
odometer."" He next engaged A & H Printing, whose employee,
Carolyn Haines, was responsible for "coordinating the scales,
relettering the street names and adding designations for the diving
sites as well as for local points of interest." In addition, "Haines
photographed the various maps to synchronize the scales and typed
individual labels for the street names."78 At trial, the district court
dhtermined that Andrien was neither the author nor ajoint author.
The Third Circuit reported:
The [district court] judge believed that Andrien had not translated
his idea into a fixed, tangible expression but that had been done
by A & H Printing, "or more specifically, Carolyn Haines." The
judge also rejected joint authorship, "I think since Andrien
supplied information and ideas from which A & H and Haines
created the map, Andrien cannot even claim to be a joint author
with A & H Printing."'
The district court's opinion thus follows the Marshall-Goldstein defini-
tion of "author." Because A & H Printing had fixed Andrien's ideas
(not Andrien himself), A & H was the author, not Andrien.
The Third Circuit, however, analyzed the issue differently. The act
of fixation is not what makes someone an author, the court said."'
If that were the case, then printers, typesetters, and stenographers
73. Production Contractors, Inc. v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 622 F. Supp. 1500,
1503 (N.D. IMI. 1985); H.RL REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976), ,p*rinted in 1976
U.S.C.CA.N. 5659,5665 (allowing for future possibility of copyright of derivative works); see also
Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 337 (5th Cir.
1987) (holding that plaintiff was not statutory author for purposes of copyright infringement
action under "work for hire" doctrine).
74. 927 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1991).





79. Id. at 134.
80. Id. at 135.
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would wrest authorship from the grasp of those who actually generate
the ideas."' The court began its analysis by quoting the language of
the 1976 Act: "The Copyright Act defines a work as 'fixed' in a
tangible medium of expression when 'its embodiment in a copy...
by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent...
to permit it to be ... reproduced."' 2 The court recognized a
simple fact that many courts following the Marshall-Goldstein
definition had overlooked:
The critical phrase is "by or under the authority of the author."
That statutory language and the Supreme Court's guidance
produce a definition of an author as the party who actually creates
the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into an
expression that is embodied in a copy by himself or herself, or who
authorizes another to embody the expression in a copy. The
definition, however, has limits. When one authorizes embodiment,
that process must be rote or mechanical transcription that does not
require intellectual modification or highly technical enhance-
ment ....
Poets, essayists, novelists, and the like may have copyrights even
if they do not run the printing presses or process the photographic
plates necessary to fix the writings into book form. These writers
are entitled to copyright protection even if they do not perform
with their own hands the mechanical tasks of putting the material
into the form distributed to the public.
s3
The Third Circuit's approach in Andrien is very different from the
Marshall-Goldstein definition. It is also quite different from Professor
Nimmer's definition, although the Court did cite Nimmer approvingly
when formulating its own approach 4 Judge Weis, who wrote the
opinion, never inquired whether Andrien's contribution was de
minimis. Rather, the judge apparently believed that what Andrien
had done entitled him to be characterized as an "author." Neverthe-
less, the Andrien court failed to state a positive rule that explained why
what Andrien had done made him an author. Instead, to his credit,
Judge Weis did at least hold that fixation was not a prerequisite to the
characterization as "author."
8 5
81. See infra note 83 and accompanying text (indicating that if mere fixation were equated
with authorship, then those entrusted with fixation would receive undue copyright protection).
82. Andrien, 927 F.2d at 134 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101) (omissions in text of opinion).
83. It. at 134-35 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
84. 1& at 135 ("Significant to the case at hand is Nimmer's comment emphasizing that a
party can be considered an author when his or her expression of an idea is transposed by
mechanical or rote transcription into tangible form under the authority of the party.").
85. it at 135-36.
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III. CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY DEFINITIONS: AUTHOR AS
COMMUNICATOR
A. A New Interpretation of "Author"
In addition to the broad support that the Marshall-Goldstein
copyrightability definition of "author" has received in the courts, 86
commentators also have jumped on the bandwagon.87 Nimmer's de
minimis definition of "author" has received harsh criticism in the
scholarly literature and only limited backing.' Courts and commen-
tators applaud the Marshall-Goldstein definition because it provides
a bright-line rule.89 In almost the same breath, courts and commen-
tators criticize Nimmer's de minimis definition because the 1976 Act
clearly tells us that intangible ideas are not protectible. ° Other
scholars wax eloquent about the author as a "creative genius" or
implore that we recognize this characterization as an archaic,
romantic hoax.91 Curiously, despite this case history and scholarly
commentary, there is still no genuinely viable definition of "au-
86. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (indicating that Goldstein's standard is
preferred).
87. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 8, at 175 n.124 ("The word 'author' is used throughout
this Note in its broad copyright sense as any creator of a work entitled to copyright protec-
tion."); Kugele, supra note 61, at 841 (concluding that "copyrightability standard provides better
gauge of risks in litigation and so provides incentives for authors to create works"); Shari Ilene
Fine, Note, The Fate of Joint Authorship After Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 9
CARDozo ARTs & ENT. LJ. 151, 158-62 (1990) (noting that majority of courts require
copyrightable input by all parties before finding joint authorship).
88. See, e.g., Kugele, supra note 61, at 811, 837, 841 (endorsing Goldstein's copyrightability
over Nimmer's de minimis standard); Fine, supra note 87, at 162-63 (noting that Nimmer
proferred no reason for why copyrightability should not apply to contributions byjoint authors);
c.. Valachovic, supra note 18, at 217-19 (arguing that intent of parties and de minimis standard
are better criteria for determining joint authorship than copyrightability).
89. See, e.g., Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 506-07 (2d Cir. 1991) (adopting Goldstein's
views on joint authorship over Nimmer's de minimis approach); Kugele, supra note 61, at 827.
90. See, eg., Childress, 945 F.2d at 505 n.3 (criticizing Nimmer's approach to joint
authorship); Kugele, supranote 61, at 837 (showing inconsistencies between Nimmer's approach
and 1976 Act).
91. See genera ly KAPLAN, supra note 7, at 23-24 (discussing historical development of "author"
in light of fixation by distinct party); Boyle, Search for an Author, supra note 7, at 625. Describing
the romantic vision of art and authorship, Professor Boyle states, "The author is presumed to
have an almost transcendental insight-something which cuts beneath the mundane world of
everyday appearance. This transcendental insight or genius plays a very important role in
establishing the author as the ruler of the text." kI& at 629; see also Boyle, Theosy of Law, supra
note 7, at 1415. "It is my argument in this Article that much contemporary economic analysis
conceals these tensions, aporias, and empirically unverifiable assumptions by relying
unconsciously on the notion of the romantic author." Id. at 1453. "Even the most cursory
historical study reveals that our notion of 'authorship' is an invented concept of relatively recent
provenance." Id. at 1463.
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thor."92 The Marshall-Goldstein definition is dearly wrong; the court
in Andrien identified the fallacy of that definition.93 The statute
allows that a work may be "fixed" either "by or under the authority of
the author."4 Thus, fixation cannot be the key to becoming an
author. Similarly, it seems unlikely that Professor Nimmer's definition
can be right since the 1976 Act does insist that ideas are not
copyrightable and it would be inconsistent with established copyright
law and policy to characterize the generator of an abstract idea as a"copyright author."" In short, it seems that no one has gotten it
completely right. Judge Weis in Andrien comes the closest, but he has
left out several steps along the way. The statute does, indeed, make
it clear that an author need not necessarily fix his work himself or
else lose his status as "author." Rather, the statute provides that an
author may "authorize" another to fix his work.96 Thus, the statute
contemplates that becoming an author is not contingent on a work
ever being fixed. Copyright protection may, and indeed actually does,
hinge on fixation, but the status of "author" does not.
A close reading of the statute suggests that the sine qua non of
becoming a "copyright author" is the act of communication. On the
most elementary level, a copyright author is a communicator. To be
an "author" for purposes of copyright, one must communicate
original expression either directly-by fixing the expression in a
tangible medium oneself-or indirectly-by communicating it to
another who fixes the expression in a tangible medium of expression.
Whether the fixator to whom the author has communicated his
original expression (for whom the appellation "scribe" or"amanuensis" may be appropriate) can also be characterized as an
92. SeeJessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. PrIT. L. REv. 235, 235-37 (1991) (indicatingthat debate continues regarding "authorship" definition). In an influential artide, ProfessorLitman defined "author" "in the copyright sense of anyone who creates copyrightable works,whether they be books, songs, sculptures, buildings, computer programs, paintings or films."Id. at 236 n.5. The ambiguity here is troublesome too. The word "creates" causes the problem.Does the word "create" mean creation in one's imagination, creation in tangible form, or rather
does it refer to activity that is "creative?"
93. See supra text accompanying note 83 (identifying potential problem of non-authors
claiming author status due to acts of fixation). A student note also made this point even beforeAndrien. See Therese M. Brady, Note, Manifest Intent and Cojryightability: The Destiny of JointAuthorship, 17 FoRDHAm URB. LJ. 257 (1989). "Erroneous expansions of authorship within thejoint authorship doctrine include: the 'de minimis doctrine,' the 'fr' qualifying as creator withoutauthoring the mcpression, and ideas qualifying as contributions in a joint work." I at 284(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). "The statutory definition of'fixed' requires fixation byor under the authority of the author, therefore, authorship exists prior to fixation." Id. at 293.
94. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
95. Id § 102(b).
96. Id § 101,
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author himself will depend on whether his contribution is also an
original expression."
In addition, an author ordinarily does something prior to the act
of communication. As a precursor to the communication component
of being an author, an author generally, consciously or subconscious-
ly, conceives a mental image (either visual or auditory) of his original
expression. Many courts and commentators have focused on this
mysterious, mental dimension of authorship.98  This element,
however, is not necessarily always present. It is entirely possible for
an author to produce original expression without first forming a
mental conception of that expression.99 When a pop artist throws
paint at a canvas, he does not necessarily picture in his mind what the
expression will look like after the paint settles. Nevertheless, his
failure to conceptualize the expression mentally before its physical
creation does not prevent the work from being copyrightable, nor
does it prevent him from being an author."00 Thus, first and
foremost, the definition of "author" depends on the act of communi-
cating original expression. Although we may find the mental
aspect-either conscious or subconscious-of authorship emotionally
appealing, it is not a prerequisite to being a "copyright author."
To explain why this definition of author is correct, one need only
examine the language of the 1976 Act itself. Furthermore, additional
evidence reinforces this definition. The legislative history of the 1976
Act, the legislative history of the 1909 Act, cases decided under that
97. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500,506-07 (2d Cir. 1991) (refusing to award author status
to contribution of mere ideas). For example, in Childress, the court wrestled with the question
of whether an editor's contributions could be sufficient to make him an "author." Id. at 502-03.
It is likely that a court would hold that minor editorial revisions to a text are so trivial that
they fail to rise to the level of either "originality" or "expression." See id. at 508; see also
Educational Testing Serv. v. Miller, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1467, 1469-70 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding
that State Department's involvement in plaintiff's crafting of Foreign Service Examination was
insufficient to establish collaboration and joint ownership). Contract law might also solve this
problem. It may be that, in this type of situation, there is an implied contract between the
editor/researcher and dominant author whereby the editor/researcher grants his copyright
interest to the dominant author in return for the remuneration that he will reap.
98. Yen, supra note 7, at 554 ("Authorship is therefore not the creation of works which
spring like Athena from the head of Zeus, but the conscious and unconscious intake, digestion
and transformation of input gained from the author's experience within a broader society.")
(citing Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY UJ. 965, 966-67 (1990)); see infra text
accompanying notes 166-224 (tracing history of concept and jurisprudence of authorship).
99. SeeJustin Hughes, The Philosophy ofIntellectual Property, 77 GEO. LJ. 287, 311 (1988)
(explaining that there are "occasions in which the 'execution' step begins before the idea")
(footnote omitted).
100. See Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding
that work can be copyrightable despite fact that it is scenes afaire or "scenes which necessarily
result from identical situations"). A work thus can be protected by copyright even if its creator
did not conceive the idea on which it is based, but just created an expression based on scenes a
faie Hughes, supra note 99, at 313.
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Act, as well as the eighteenth century understanding of "author" as
the Framers of the Constitution used that term, all support this
definition of author as communicator.
B. Language of the 1976 Copyright Act
The 1976 Act does not explicitly define "author." Nevertheless
three sections combine to create the definition. First, § 102(a)
provides:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly
or with the aid of a machine or device. 01
Therefore, in order for something to receive copyright protection
under the 1976 Act, it must be "original," a "work[] of authorship,"
and "fixed in a tangible medium of expression."
Case law has defined a work as "original" when it is created
independently and evinces a "modicum of creativity.'"02 The 1976
Act itself does not define a "work of authorship" but it does list eight
categories of things deemed to be "works of authorship": (1) literary
works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3)
dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes
and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound record-
ings; and (8) architectural works."0 The 1976 Act defines "fixed"
as follows:
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of
the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
101. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
102. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991); Bellsouth
Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436, 1440-43 (11th
Cir. 1993); Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Mason v. Montgomery
Data, Inc. 967 F.2d 135, 138, 140-43 (5th Cir. 1992). Accord Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v.
Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1344-47 (5th Cir. 1994); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando
Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 837 (10th Cir. 1993); Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656, 660, 663
(2d Cir. 1993); Autoskill Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1495 (10th Cir.
1993); Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 991 F.2d 417,420-23 (7th Cir. 1992); Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer,
970 F.2d 1067, 1074-78 (2d Cir. 1992); Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing
Enters., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 703 (2d Cir.
1991); Victor Lalli Enters. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir. 1991); GI Corp. v.
United States Elecs. Components Corp., No. 93-CM, 1994 WL 494698 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 1994)
at *8-9, 14; Budish v. Gordon, 784 F. Supp. 1320, 1332-33 (N.D. Ohio 1992); Lipton v. Nature
Co., 781 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business Mach.
Corp., 770 F. Supp. 1004, 1010 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
103. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(I)-(8).
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perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration."4
The court in Andrien succinctly pointed out how the Act's definition
of "fixed" makes it possible for something to be a "work" and for
someone to be an "author" before the moment of fixation." 5 This
statutory provision also establishes two concrete things, and the doing
of either one will qualify someone as an "author"-the initial owner
of the copyright. An author either fixes or authorizes another to fix
his work.
Section 102(b) of the Act completes the picture by barring
copyright protection for ideas, procedures, and methods, regardless
of the manner in which they might be embodied.10 ' Thus, under
§§ 101, 102(a), and 102(b) of the 1976 Act, an author is the person
who either fixes or authorizes fixation of an original expression:
something that is not an idea, procedure, or method barred by the
prohibition in § 102(b). Hence, an author communicates his original
expression either directly or indirectly. In order to be a copyright
author, therefore, one must meet three criteria: (1) the putative
author must communicate something that is original; (2) that original
something communicated must be expression; and (3) the putative
author must communicate that original expression (a) directly himself
through the act of fixation or (b) indirectly by authorizing another to
fix it. Many who have discussed the role of "author" have explored
the cerebral aspects of authorship. 1 7  Nevertheless, the statutory
definition avoids this problem by recognizing that authors often
create spontaneously without first conceptualizing the expression
either consciously or subconsciously.s
104. 1& § 101 (emphasis added).
105. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (noting that person need not personally
fix work in order to be considered its "author"). A student author recognized this fact
observing- "Thus, the statute contemplates that authorship precedes fixation, and therefore,
fixation does not itself confer authorship status on the fixer." Brady, supra note 93, at 293 n,241.
Professor Kaplan even suggested that Congress' constitutional power could permit copyright
protection for unfixed works. "The draftsman evidently believed that the copyright clause in
speaking of 'Writings,' confines the federal power to works that are 'fixed.' I should rather
think the copyright power supplemented by the 'necessary and proper' clause permits federal
regulation of a work anticipating its fixation." KAPLAN, supra note 7, at 97-98.
106. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
107. See Hughes, supra note 99, at 311 (stating that execution of work can occur before idea).
108. Seeinfra notes 166-224 and accompanying text (discussing origin and intellectual history
of concept of "author").
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C. The Three Statutory Elements: An Explanation
1. Originality
In order to be copyrightable, a work must be "original," and in fact,
the Supreme Court has recognized that originality is the sine qua non
of copyrightability.1°9 The 1976 Act requires originality"' and the
Supreme Court has held that the Constitution established originality
as a requirement for copyrightability."' In Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Co.,"' the Supreme Court explained that
"[o] riginal, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work
was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from
other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity."' 3 Some evidence suggests that the phrase "minimal
degree of creativity" should be interpreted to mean that the work is
something more than a trivial variation of its precursors." 4
The legislative history of the 1976 Act shows that some drafters were
particularly troubled by the phrase "works of authorship" and sought to
109. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
110. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). The 1976 Act states that "[c]opyright protection subsists ... in
original works of authorship." Id. (emphasis added).
111. Feist, 499 U.S. at 346. The Court asserted:
Originality is a constitutional requirement. The source of Congress' power to enact
copyright laws is Article I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to
"secur[e] for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings." In two decisions from the late 19th Century-The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S.
82 (1879); and Burrow-Gies Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884)-this Court
defined the crucial terms "authors" and "writings." In so doing, the Court made it
unmistakably clear that these terms presuppose a degree of originality.
Id. The Court added that Professors Patterson andJoyce had made the point in a succinct
manner, stating that "'[t]he originality requirement is constitutionally mandated for all works,'"
id. (quoting L. Ray Patterson & CraigJoyce, Monopoizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection
for Law Reports and Statutoy Compilations, 36 UCLA L REV. 719, 763 n.155 (1989)).
112. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
113. Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co, 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
114. See Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 841-43 (1993)
(describing trivial/distinguishable analysis) [hereinafterVerSteeg, Rethinking Originality]. Under
the trivial/distinguishable analysis, courts have held that a "copy of something in the public
domain" can be copyrightable if it is a"distinguishable variation" or the author contributes more
than a "merely trivial" variation. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102
(2d Cir. 1951). Professor Kaplan recognized the link between these two concepts (i.e.,
"creativity" and a variation that is "more than 'trivial'").
Some have thought it inherent in the very notion of "personality," of spontaneity, that
a copyright claimant must exceed the utterly stilted or trite, must satisfy some threshold
requirement of "creativity." And though Judge Frank pushed hard in the Alfred Bell
case to show the theoretical protectibility of any original production, he still admitted
that a variation, say, on a public domain work must be more than "trivial" to support
copyright.
KAPLAN, supra note 7, at 45 (citations omitted).
THE AMERICAN UNmERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1323
find meaning in the word "authorship.""' They were concerned
that judges in the future might interpret the word "authorship" to
require some elevated sense of "originality" or "author:"
But may [future judges] not be misled into thinking that we mean
to distinguish between the works of those who are authors by
profession, as opposed to those who write only as a hobby? Surely
we don't mean to exclude amateur authors; but isn't there a danger
that a court might.., be misled into thinking that that's what we
meant?
Another* dictionary definition of "authorship" is "Origination,
esp. of a literary work." Again, we have the conflict between the
categories and the definition's reference to literary works. And I'm
troubled by what a court might do confronted with "original
originations." Such a double stress on originality, I fear, may bring
in, with another word, all the difficulties we've hitherto had over
"creativity." There is, I think, a real danger of this kind in this
apparent redundancy, quite apart from the offense to one's sense
of aesthetics to which it gives rise."
6
Indeed, the 1976 Act does not require that an author be a
professional. Similarly, the Act does not require "creativity," it
requires "originality."17  "It necessarily follows (from both constitu-
tional as well as statutory sources) that a contributor must have
contributed something original to be deemed an author for purposes
of the Act.""'
2. Exprssion
The word "author" in the 1976 Act has a more narrow meaning
than the word "author" as it is generally used in the English language.
For example, as "author" is generally used in English, it can be said
that Einstein was the "author" of the theory of relativity and the
concept that E=mc'. The theory of relativity and the concept that
energy is equal to mass times the speed of light squared, however, are
not "writings," they are uncopyrightable ideas. Thus, Einstein cannot
115. See H.R. REP. NO. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d., Sess. 51-52 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,5664-66 (describing proper application of term "work of authorship" as used
throughout Act).
116. Copyright Law Revision: 1964 Revision Bill wdth Discussion and Comments, pt. 5, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 340 (1965), rprinted in 4 OMNIBUs, supra note 6, pt. 5, at 340 (statement ofjohn F.
Whicher).
117. See generally Russ VerSteeg, Sparks in the Tinderbox: Feist, "Creativity," and the Legislative
History of the 1976 Copyright Act, 56 U. Prrr. L. REV. 549, 550 (1995) (challenging Supreme
Court's conclusion that creativity is necessary for copyrightability) [hereinafter VerSteeg, Sparks
in the Tinderbox].
118. Respect Inc. v. Committee on the Status of Women, 815 F. Supp. 1112, 1120 (N.D. IlL.
1993).
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be said to be the "author" for purposes of copyright (the "copyright
author"). During the drafting of the 1976 Act, attorneyJohn Whicher
pointed out this potential error in interpreting the word "author."
He noted that one "dictionary definition of 'authorship' is 'Instiga-
tion; as authorship of a crime.'"'19 Perhaps recognizing that a
copyright author must produce "expression" (not facts or ideas),
Whicher remarked, "I don't think this definition is terribly relevant to
anything before us."'2 0
This means that not everyone who has an idea qualifies as a
"copyright author." As previously noted,' one of the fundamental
principles of copyright is that ideas are not copyrightable; only the
expressions of those ideas are copyrightable.'2 2 While a comprehen-
sive review of the idea/expression dichotomyI" is beyond the scope
of this Article, for purposes of defining the copyright author, these
concepts are critical. A person who-mentally conceives an idea-as
the word "idea" has been defined as a term of art in copyright
law-cannot become a copyright author solely by virtue of that
conception. A person who mentally conceives an "expression" cannot
become an author solely by virtue of that conception either. Unlike
119. Copyright LawReision: 1964 Re;on BiU with Discussion and Comments, pt 5,89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 340 (1965), reprinted in 4 OMNIBus, supra note 6, pt. 5, at 340 (statement of John F.
Whicher).
120. Id., reipinted in 4 OMNIBUS, supra note 6, pt. 5, at 340 (statement ofJohn F. Whicher).
121. See supranotes 41, 46, 48, 62, 90, 95 and 106 and accompanying text (describing various
theories of copyright that protect expression of ideas, but not ideas themselves).
122. See Yen, supra note 7, at 537-38 (describing natural law roots of idea/expression
dichotomy). Professor Yen observed that "[e]xpressions such as the text of a work are the
proper subject of copyright because they are sufficiently concrete for the law to transform them
into property. By contrast, ideas are so incorporeal that the law simply cannot make them into
property." Id. at 538. He continued, "The origin of this notion can be traced directly to Roman
times. In an apparent reference to res communes, the Roman Seneca stated that 'ideas are
common property.'" Id. at n.138 (citing Epistles 12, 11, quoted in 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 62, § 16.01, at n.4); see also 7 W.S. HoLDSWoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 480 (1926)
("[A]ccording to Roman law, occupatio[n], being founded on possessio[n], and only corporeal
things being capable of possessiotn], it was only corporeal things which could be thus
acquired."). Yen, supra note 7, at 538 n.138. In an excellent exploration of this subject,
Professor Leslie Kurtz states:
The basic principle underlying the dichotomy is that expression is protected but ideas
are not. These unprotected ideas, however, tend to exist, at least in the context of
copyright cases, within works that are copyrightable and copyrighted. Ideas, like facts,
scenes a faire, and expressions that can only take a limited number of forms, are
termed unprotectible elements within that protected work.
Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Exprssion in Copy ght, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1221,
1232-33 (1993) (citations omitted); see also KAPLAN, supra note 7, at 47-53 (examining
idea/expression as applied in numerous cases); Hughes, supra note 99, at 295 (stating that
"bundle of rights" that drapes around idea extends not to "abstract lines" but to "concrete,
tangible or physical embodiment of an abstraction").
123. See Chafee, supra note 10, at 513 (stating that line between idea and expression falls
roughly between author's idea and ultimate force in which idea is manifested and that
"protection covers the 'pattern' of the work").
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the person who mentally conceives a mere idea, however, a person
who mentally conceives an expression can become an author if she
then fixes that expression or authorizes another who fixes it. When
a composer thinks about writing a melody that will evoke in the
listener a mood of summertime, that mental process does not make
her a copyright author because the composer has merely conceived
an "idea." Once the composer "hears" the music in her head and
then either fixes it herself or communicates it to another for the
purpose of fixation, however, she qualifies as an author because the
mental conception of the notes constitutes "expression," not merely
an "idea."24  This proposition-that mental expression exists-is
perfectly obvious. "Expression" need not be fixed in a tangible
medium in order to create authorship. Fixation is a requirement of
copyrightability but it is not a statutory requirement of authorship.
Johannsen v. Brown ' illustrates this idea/expression problem in
the context of defining "author." InJohannsen, the issue was whether
an employee's contribution to an artist's work, which became a cover
on Relix Magazine, was significant enough to make the employee a
joint author of a magazine cover.26 Les Kippel, the employee,
conceived of the entire idea of substituting skeletons for the
farming couple in the work "American Gothic." He entitled the
piece "American Relix" using the association of Grateful Dead fans
with Relix magazine and playing on the meaning of the word
"relics." He specified all details, including colors, hair stylejewelry
and the substitution of a guitar for the farmer's pitchfork." 7
Even though the employee had conceptualized the work in such vivid
detail and had communicated that image to the artist, the court
quoted Justice Marshall's Community for Creative Nonviolence v. Reid
dictum,"' and held that the employee "cannot, as a matter of law,
124. See Yen, supra note 7, at 538 (distinguishing "expression" from "ideas" on basis that
expressions are more concrete than ideas). Professor Kurtz also has offered a number of
suggestions that should prove useful in helping a court determine when something is an "idea"
and when it is an "expression." Kurtz, supra note 122, at 1241-61. Professor Kurtz points out
the fallacy of defining things as "ideas" merely because they are intangible. She states, "However
an idea gets into the mind, whether impressed upon it from the outside, produced from within,
or innately residing there, 'idea' means something that exists within a human mind." This
meaning will not suffice, in copyright terms, to divide protectible expression from unprotectible
idea. Id at 1243.
125. 797 F. Supp. 835 (D. Or. 1992).
126. Johanssen v. Brown, 797 F. Supp. 835, 841-42 (D. Or. 1992). If the employee's
contribution had been significant enough to make him ajoint author, then the magazine would
be considered the joint author, due to the work-for-hire doctrine. See generally LEArFER, supra
note 37, § 5.2, at 148-55.
127. Johannsen, 797 F. Supp. at 842.
128. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) (noting that
author is person who translates idea into fixed or tangible medium); see supra note 14 and
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be considered a joint author of 'American Relix. ''" 2 9 According to
the court in Johannsen, "[a] n author is a 'party who actually creates
the work, that is, [a] person who translates an idea into a fixed,
tangible expression entitled to copyright protection.""'  The court
further held that "[f] or the purposes ofjoint authorship, each author
must 'make an independently copyrightable contribution.
'"131
Predictably, the court equated existence in a state of intangibility with
the existence of an "idea."
Kippel's contributions to "American Relix" were to suggest to [the
artist] Johannsen how the work should appear and to create the
title for the work. However, "[a] person who merely describes to
an author what the commissioned work should... look like is not
a joint author for purposes of the Copyright Act." Kippel's
conception of the idea behind "American Relix" is insufficient, as
a matter of law, to make him a joint author of the work.
3 2
The real problem with Johannsen is the court's confusion about
"ideas." Because Kippel's contribution was intangible, the court
jumped to the conclusion that it was an "idea" without actually
examining whether it was an "idea" as the word "idea" is used as a
term of art in copyright law. Kippel's contribution was probably far
more than an idea-it was probably expression.133 The detail with
which Kippel described to the artist what to do probably pushed his
contribution over the line of idea into the realm of intangible
expression. Thus, Kippel's participation in the magazine's cover, in
all probability, should have been sufficient to make him a joint
author.'-'
Many courts and commentators who have examined the issue of
defining "author"-partcularly in the context ofjoint authors-have
accompanying text.
129. Johannsen 797 F. Supp. at 842.
130. Id. (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 737).
131. Id. (quoting Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1990)).
132. Id. (quoting S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989)).
133. See LEAnFER, supra note 37, § 2.12, at 58 (noting that copyright law protects expression
of ideas, but not ideas themselves and that process of separating idea from its expression is ad
hoc, balancing tension between defining idea versus expression broadly).
134. This conclusion assumes, of course, that the intent element ofjoint authorship was also
present. In addition, it must be remembered that Kippel's employer would have been the legal
author under the work-for-hire doctrine. See supra notes 37 and 126 (describing conditions
necessary to make employee joint author under work-for-hire doctrine).
Two cases whose results are consistent with using the idea/expression dichotomy to determine
the definition of "author" are Mister B Textiles, Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 21,
25 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that plaintiff's employee's pictures of garments and modifications
she wanted made constituted sufficient participation to award plaintiff with joint authorship),
and Kenbrooke Fabrics, Inc. v. Material Things, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1039, 1044-45 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (holding that textile converter was not author of design he had commissioned when his
only contribution was general request for design incorporating stripes and floral boarder).
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failed to appreciate that what separates idea from expression is not
the act of fixation."s This is one of the harmful defects in cases
like Johannsen that follow Childress. When two people combine their
efforts to produce a copyrightable work, let us call them A and B, and
if B embodies A's intangible contribution, that embodiment is
ordinarily done with A's permission. Thus, there is no fixation
problem as long as A's intangible contributions are not merely "ideas"
in the "idea/expression" sense of the word "ideas." The dispositive
question should be whether A's intangible contribution rises to the
level of copyrightable expression as opposed to merely an
uncopyrightable idea."8 6 Tangibility does not distinguish idea from
expression; the dichotomy is far more sophisticated than that. And
although this sophistication may make the line difficult to draw, that
is where Congress has chosen to draw it, and that is where sound
copyright doctrine and policy dictate that it be drawn."3
135. See, e.g., Brady, supra note 93, at 295. Brady is correct in her criticism of Justice
Marshall's dictum in Reid 490 U.S. at 730. Justice Marshall wrote that "[a]s a general rule, the
author is the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into
a fixed, tangible expression . ... " Id. at 737. Brady observes that "[Re'dl approaches the
idea/expression dichotomy with the erroneous assumption that fixing an idea makes it an
expression and, therefore, copyrightable. The idea/expression dichotomy is not contingent on
a fixing of the work; making an abstract idea concrete does not convert it into expression."
Brady, supra note 93, at 295 (footnotes omitted). Brady further states that "[tihe fixation
requirement is separate and distinct from the idea/expression dichotomy." (footnote omitted).
Id. Last, Brady states that "[t]o qualify as an author, one must contribute expressions, not ideas,
whether the work is to be solely or jointly owned." Id at 296.
136. When A's contribution is not an expression but only an uncopyrightable idea, it may
be that parties ordinarily intend to create an implied contract for joint ownership (not joint
authorship). In exchange for A's idea, B can give part of the copyright ownership to A. This
concept is similar to protection of ideas in a corporate setting. If ideas are sufficiently concrete
and given to another under circumstances where compensation is expected, then B can be
granted one-half ownership. See, eg., Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 844 F.2d 988, 993
(2d Cir. 1988) (holding that television program format, tides, set designs, theme music, stories,
scripts and artwork created under contract would be considered property, although mere idea
forsitcom about non-stereotypical black family is not property); Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Belt, 210
F.2d 706, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (holding that individual has property rights in ideas that are
original, concrete, and useful, even if such ideas are disclosed in contemplation of compensa-
tion). Courts have traditionally tried to shoehorn this implied contractual relationship between
A and B into the rubric of "authorship." Perhaps, however, this is the problem. In some cases
there is a contract or an implied contract for joint owmership absent technical joint authorship.
In copyright law, there are subtle differences between the rights ofjoint ouners as opposed to
those ofjoint authors. See LEAFFER, supra note 37, § 5.4[c], at 158-59; see also 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)
(1994) (noting that author, not necessarily owner, has right to terminate transfers after 35
years); 17 U.S.C. § 302(b) (1994) (stating that in jointly authored works, copyright lasts for 50
years after death of last surviving author).
137. Professor Kurtz has suggested that there are certain "symptoms" that may help a court
separate protectible expressions from unprotectible ideas. See Kurtz, supra note 122, at 1253-60.
Specifically Kurtz noted that when something is simple, general, or conventional, courts tend
to label that something as an "idea." See Kurtz, supra note 122, at 1253-56. On the other hand,
things that are complex, specific, or unorthodox are likely to be characterized as "expressions."
Kurtz, supra note 122, at 1252-60; see also Hughes, supra note 99, at 319-23 (observing that
"everyday ideas" are not protected by copyright law).
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3. Communication by fixation and the red herring of conceptualization
a. Communication by fixation
When a blind poet dictates her poetry to a personal secretary,
although the secretary is responsible for the words gaining their
existence in a tangible form, the poet is the copyright author, not the
secretary. Clearly, the secretary is not the author even though, as a
scribe, he is a "but for" cause of the poem's physical embodiment.
Similarly, when a writer sends a manuscript to a publisher or editor,
the publisher or editor generally helps the writer by "editing." This
process of editing routinely involves an editor making suggestions and
corrections. These range from wholesale revision of a work to the
addition of a comma, and everything in between. An editor might
add, delete, or rearrange punctuation, words, phrases, sentences,
paragraphs, or chapters."~ But these additions, deletions, and
rearrangements do not necessarily make the editor an author.
Justice Marshall was clearly correct when he stated that an author
as a general rule is the person who translates an idea into a tangible
medium of expression." The presumption should be that the
fixator is also the author. That is why when someone directly fixes his
work in a tangible medium we assume that he is the author. Not
every author, however, fixes his own expression into a tangible
medium. The poet and secretary example illustrates this proposition.
The title "author" cannot attach to the person who merely fixes
another's ideas, imagery, words, or expression. Under the provisions
of the 1976 Act, if Ella Fitzgerald sings and a listener presses the
"record" button on a tape recorder, the listener is not the author. If
a dancer performs an original dance and an observer-without her
knowledge or permission-captures the dance on videotape, the
dancer remains the author of that expression. The observer may be
the author with respect to the light and angles, but the choreography
belongs to the dancer. Suppose further that the observer takes the
videotape to another choreographer who watches the tape and then
meticulously transcribes the dancer's steps and movements into
Labanotation. Now assume that the observer registers the copyright
to the choreography using the choreographer's Labanotation, falsely
138. See5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 72 (2d ed. 1989). An editor often also acts as
proofreader, catching mistakes in spelling, syntax, and grammar.
139. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989); see also
sup ra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing who constitutes an "author" and is entitled to
copyright protection).
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claiming to be the author. The first dancer is still the author of the
choreography. The observer is the author of the videotape-in terms
of the selection of light and angles. Furthermore, now that the
dancer's steps have been embodied in a tangible medium of expres-
sion (actually two tangible media-the videotape and the
Labanotation), the dancer's choreography could qualify for copyright
protection under the 1976 Act if she were to authorize those
embodiments."4 The videotape actually has layers of contributions.
However, like someone who compiles a list of Major League Baseball
batting averages from the highest to the lowest or someone who
photographs one of Picasso's paintings, the videotaper (in the
example above) has no copyright interest in the first layer-the
dancer's choreography. The compiler cannot be the author of the
batting averages. The photographer cannot be the author of the
Picasso.' The photographer may be the author of the photograph
of the Picasso, but she is the author only to the extent that her
contribution is deemed original.
1 4 1
A fixator has no more copyright interest in a work created by
another than a compiler of facts has in the facts themselves.4  If
140. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976). "(A] work should be
considered 'fixed in a tangible medium of expression' if there has been an authorized embodiment
in a copy or phonorecord . . ." Id. (emphasis added). The record does not state whether such
authorization can come after the act of embodiment. Id. It is probably useful to be careful
about how one uses the verbs "fix" and "embody." According to the 1976 Act, fixation is a
special kind of embodiment-the only kind of embodiment that leads to copyright protection.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101. Fixation is embodiment that is quite permanent or stable, brought about
either directly by the author or indirectly with the permission ("authorization") of the author.
Id An unauthorized embodiment, under the language of the 1976 Act, is not "fixed" because
it lacks the essential element of "authorization." Id.
141. SeeMoritav. Omni Publications Int'l, 741 F. Supp. 1107, 1111 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding
that without registration of artwork in photograph, plaintiff cannot maintain suit for copyright
infringement on theory of ownership of copyright of underlying artwork). In the case of the
batting average compiler, she probably has no authorship interest at all. Arranging batting
averages from highest to lowest probably lacks originality. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (stating that writings require originality).
142. See VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, supra note 114, at 801 (discussing legal meaning of
word "originality" and offering standards for evaluating copyright originality); see also Friedman,
supra note 8, at 157-58 (explaining that originality, and hence copyright protection, does not
spring from mechanical process like printing press but rather only in those instances where
person exercises "self expression"). Presumably, the dancer, as author, could have a number
of common law causes of action against a clandestine videotaper (e.g., invasion of privacy,
infringement of a right of publicity, defamation, fhlse representation). See KAPLAN, supra note
7, at 98.
143. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. For an interesting case decided under the 1909 Act holding that
the scribe (who most certainly had contributed significant material to the finished work
product) became the copyright "author" when the dominant author authorized fixation but
failed to "reserve his common law copyright," see Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc.,
244 N.E.2d 250, 256 (N.Y. 1968).
For present purposes, it is enough to observe that Hemingway's words and conduct,
far from making any such reservation, left no doubt of his willingness to permit
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the fixator's contribution can qualify as original expression itself, then
the fixator can also be an "author"-but not an author of the
underlying work and not even, necessarily, ajoint author. The fixator
is not a joint author unless both the creator and fixator intend that
their contributions be merged into an interdependent whole.M
The legislative history of the 1976 Act supports the theory that a
copyright author is someone who communicates expression. The
legislative history also buttresses the notion that an author need not
be a fixator. Comments of the drafters of the 1976 Act illustrate that
one can be an author prior to the moment of fixation. For example,
one Senate Report explained:
Under the bill, the concept of fixation is important since it not only
determines whether the provisions of the statute apply to a work,
but it also represents the dividing line between common law and
statutory protection. As will be noted in more detail in connection
with section 301, an unfixed work of authorship, such as an
unrecorded choreographic work, performance, or broadcast, would
be subject to protection under State common law or statute, but
would not be eligible for Federal statutory protection under section
102.145
This language-specifically, the phrase "an unfixed work of author-
ship"--shows that Congress did not intend that a "work of authorship"
had to be fixed; rather, an author can be an author without fixa-
Hotchner[, a close friend of Hemingway's and a lesser known author,] to draw freely
on their conversation in writing about him and to publish such material. What we
have said disposes of the plaintiffs' claim both to exclusive and to joint copyright and
we need not consider this aspect of the case any further.
Id. at 256. The definition of "fixed" in the 1976 Act would make such a decision unlikely today
because Hemingway's authorization of fixation would make him at the very least ajoint author,
and more probably the sole author. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
144. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. Thus, when courts and commentators
embrace the Marshall-Goldstein position that each joint author's contribution must be
independently copyrightable in order forjoint authorship to exist, the only way to salvage that
position to make it tenable is to interpret it to mean that each contribution must be an "original
expression" not idea. Each author's contribution need not, however, be fixed.
145. S. REP. No. 983, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 549 (1974), reprinted in OMNIBUS, supra note 6, pt.
13, at 104-05.
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tion.146 The House Report 47 adopted this language from the
Senate Report almost verbatim."
Regarding whether the act of fixation itself could qualify as author-
ship, Joseph Dubin of Universal Pictures and Abe Goldman, counsel
for the Copyright Office, had the following exchange during the
drafting process of the 1976 Act
Dubin. You mean the mere mechanical acts of recording will be
deemed to be a work of authorship?
Goldman. It will be, in much the same way as the mere mechani-
cal act of photographing a motion picture.
Dubin. I am concerned about the physical act rather than what
is contained in the recording.
Goldman. Well, this would cover the recording, meaning what's
contained in the recording, of course.' 4
Robert Evans of CBS pressed Goldman on this issue: "I wanted to ask
Mr. Goldman if it is the act of recording that creates the subject
matter of copyright?"I'5 Goldman responded: "It's the product of
the act of recording."' Evans tried to clarify: "The product. That
is to say, a record containing bird calls or sound effects would be a
subject of copyright."'52  To that, Goldman replied: "I suppose it
might be. If it's an original work of authorship, and I can conceive
that this could be so."
15
With respect to this same issue, during the drafting process of the
1976 Act, the Speech Association of America was troubled by the
prospect of having no copyright protection for unfixed oral presenta-
tions. Their expression of concern, however, displays a misunder-
146. See Easter Seal Soc'y, Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 337 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating
that when football game is being covered by four television cameras with director guiding
activities and choosing which electronic images are sent out to public and in what order, "'there
is little doubt that what the cameramen and the director are doing constitutes 'authorship"")
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 5659,5665).
The court continued:
On the other hand, we agree with the Society that at least the musical performance
by its volunteers-if not the staged parade-was a work of authorship that needed ono
fixation to be copyrightabla And in this case, the process of fixation was sufficiently
creative and original to be a work of authorship.
Id. (emphasis added). This statement recognizes that it is possible for something to be a "work
of authorship" without being fixed.
147. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 52 (discussing scope of term "fixation").
148. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 52 (discussing scope of term "fixation").
149. See 3 OMNIBUS, supra note 6, pt. 3, at 61 (Transcript of Meeting on Preliminary Draft
for Revised U.S. Copyright Law: Discussions of §§ 1-4, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.,
Jan. 16, 1963).
150. See 3 OMNIBUS, supra note 6, pt. 3, at 61.
151. See 3 OMNIBUS, supra note 6, pt. 3, at 61.
152. See3 OMNIBUS, supra note 6, pt 3, at 61.
153. See 3OMNIBUS, supra note 6, pt. 3, at 61; see supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
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standing of some of the fundamental mechanics of the 1976 Act: "We
regret the fact that H.R. 4347 [the bill] omits, under the subject
matter of copyright (sec. 102), the category 'lectures, sermons,
addresses (prepared for oral delivery)' contained in the present
copyright law."11 4 The Association's written comments continue:
In his supplementary report, the Register explains in considerable
detail the rationale behind the elimination of all common law
protection in H.R. 4347. He indicates, however, that impromptu
speeches, unrecorded performances, and improvisations, since they
would not be "fixed in any tangible medium of expression" would
continue to be protected under common law. We submit that
additional wording is needed in the legislation itself, to make this
concept clear.
Does this suggest that there may be some doubt as to who owns
the copyright when a professor's lecture is recorded either for
transmission at a later date or spuriously by a student in his class?
By virtue of such a recording, the lecture, unless previously
recorded or written out in full, becomes immediately subject to
statutory copyright, but, apparently, the ownership of the rights
remains in doubt. We cannot believe that these ambiguities are
intentional, nor do we suggest specific remedies. We simply call
them to your attention in the hope that both clarification and
adequate protection for extemporaneous materials may be achieved
through suitable amendments.'55
One misinterpretation of the 1976 Act that is apparent in the Speech
Association's comment is the assumption that statutory copyright
would exist for a teacher's lecture "immediately." This supposition
misses important details of copyright law. First, the lectures are not
protected by copyright "immediately" upon presentation. They are
only protected "immediately" upon fixation. According to the § 101
definition of "fixed," however, a lecture "recorded... spuriously by
a student," is not fixed at all, because the adverb "spuriously" makes
it clear that the embodiment is not authorized by the "author.""5 6
Thus, in the "spurious student" hypothetical, no statutory copyright
exists due to the lack of authorization. Thus, there is no "ownership
question"-at least in terms of copyright ownership. Nevertheless,
even though the lecture would not be protected by copyright under
154. See 5 OMNIBUS, supra note 6, pt. 1, at 439 (House Hearings, 1965) (statement of W.
Work, Executive Secretary, The Speech Association of America). Section 5(c) of the 1909 Act
was the provision to which Work referred.
155. See5 OMNIBUS, supra note 6, pt. 1, at 439.
156. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
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the 1976 Act, technically the professor still would be the "author" of
the lecture. 5 7  Whether a state's common law would protect the
author is a different question.158
One Senate Report explains this essential aspect of the statute's
definition of "fixed." "The definition of 'fixed' is contained in § 101.
Under the first sentence of this definition, a work would be consid-
ered 'fixed in a tangible medium of expression' if there has been an
authorized embodiment in a copy or phonorecord and if that
embodiment is 'sufficiently permanent or stable'... .,,15 Thus, an
unauthorized embodiment is insufficient to provide the author with
copyright protection because an unauthorized embodiment does not
qualify as "fixation" under the § 101 definition of "fixed." So, even
though such a work might be embodied in a tangible form and be
original, the author has no federal copyright protection under the
1976 Act.
Therefore, it is important to distinguish between the act of fixation
and the act of authorship. Obviously, in many situations, and perhaps
in most, the two acts blend into one when the author directly fixes his
expression in a tangible medium. But it is the act of communication
that makes him an author, not the simple embodiment.
Although the 1909 Act itself did not define the word "author," "
it did not mandate that an author be a fixator. Section 62 codified
the "work-for-hire" doctrine, which instills author status on an employ-
157. This statement assumes that the copyright would not be considered "work-for-hire." See
LFAFFER, supra note 37, § 5.2[B], at 149 n.11 (explaining "work-for-hire doctrine"); see also supra
note 140 (discussing non-copyrightable status of unauthorized embodiments).
158. See generally 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 62, § 8C.01, at 80-8 to 8C-8 (explaining
that 1976 Act made copyright law in United States primarily federal, but state law continues to
fill numerous gaps not explicitly governed by federal act).
159. See S. REP. No. 988, 98d Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1974).
160. The 1909 Act did, however, make it clear that the author was extremely important.
Section 4 stated, "[IT]he works for which copyright may be secured under this Act shall include
the writings of an author." 1909 Act supra note 3, § 4 (emphasis added). The legislative history
also shows great concern for the characterization of an "author." For example, Richard R.
Bowker, Vice President of American (Authors') Copyright League, discussed what "inclusive
term" could be used "to designate the creators of intellectual property whose works would be
subject to copyright protection:"
You will notice in the resume of the American Copyright League that the word 'author'
is held to be comprehensive, and that follows, you will also notice, the word which is
used in the Constitution of the United States. Unless artists and musicians and other
inventors, so to speak, of different classes of literary property, musical, dramatic and
everything else, are included under the term 'authors' their rights would be much
more doubtful under the Constitution, and therefore it would be wise to use.., the
words 'authors of literary or artistic work....'
1 LEGISMATIvE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPM"GHT Acr 40-41 (1976) (remarks of R.R. Bowker)
[hereinafter I LEGISLATVE HISTORY 1909 AcT].
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er-someone who is not a fixator 16 1 Speaking on November 2,
1905, R.R. Bowker, Vice President of American (Authors') Copyright
League, said, "You will remember that the Constitution uses the sole
word 'author', meaning the creator of any kind of property. ...
[T]he word 'author' should be defined in a single section, which
should be absolutely comprehensive." 62 Thorvald Solberg, Register
of Copyrights, read the then-current draft of Division 2 of § 20:
"Author" as used in this act means the writer of any literary work,
the writer or speaker of any oration, lecture, or other spoken address, a
dramatist or musical composer, a painter or sculptor or the artist
of any other [original] work of art, including drawings, models and
architectural designs, the maker of a photographic negative, engrav-
ing, or other secondary work of art involving original interpretation
or distinctive artistic skill, a cartographer, the compiler of compila-
tions or collections, the editor of a distinctive edition, the writer of
annotations or additions, the maker of an abridgment, arrange-
ment, dramatization, translation, or other version lawfully made, the
conductors of a periodical, thejoint authors of a collaborative work,
163
This definition proves that even the drafters of the 1909 Act did not
believe that one needed to be a fixator in order to be an author."6
Thus, the principle that an author need not fix her work as a
condition precedent to becoming a copyright author dates back at
least to the turn of the century and is still in force today under the
1976 Act.
b. Conceptualization
Many courts and commentators have focused on cognitive activity
as being the hallmark of an "author."1" One case in particular,
decided under the 1909 Act, illustrates this fascination with the
mental component of being an author. In Oxford University Press, N. Y,
Inc. v. United States," the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
161. See 1909 Act, supra note 3, § 62 (stating that "the word 'author' shall include an
employer in the case of works made for hire").
162. See 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT Acr 143 (1976) [hereinafter 2
LEisLATIVE HISTORY 1909 AcT] (remarks of R.R. Bowker).
163. Id. at 144 (remarks of T. Solberg) (emphasis added).
164. See Ud at 147 (remarks of Herbert Putnam) (summarizing Bowker's concept of "the
author," by stating that "by the author [Bowker] means the originator or maker of the work").
165. See infra notes 166-224 and accompanying text (discussing origins of term "author,"
historical emphasis on importance of intellectual or cognitive act of creation, and how term has
evolved in context of copyright law).
166. 33 C.C.PA 11 (1945). Many cases decided under the 1909 Act that offer insight into
the nature of authorship look to the question ofjoint authorship and focus on the issue of the
intent of the parties rather than their authorship. See Laskowitz v. Marie Designer, Inc., 119 F.
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stressed that mental activity was necessary for authorship. According
to the court:
[A]uthorship implies that there has been put into the production
something meritorious from the author's own mind; that the
product embodies the thought of the author ... and would not
have found existence in the form presented, but for the distinctive
individuality of mind from which it sprang.
Running through all the cases is the controlling principle that
for a thing to be the work of an "author," it must be something that
is more or less the product of mental activity as distinguished from
that which is purely mechanical. 7
Much of this emphasis on the metaphysical-mental side of being an
author can be traced to the historical evolution of authorship during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Therefore, one can
appreciate better the role of conceptualization as a constituent
element of becoming an author by first understanding the historical
background. Initially, scholars and courts defined authorship in terms
of a person's mental process and personality. Toward the twentieth
century, copyright law began to recognize communication as the most
important ingredient for becoming an author.
To begin with, the English word "author" comes from the Latin
noun auctor"s The Latin word auctor has several meanings that
sound familiar. "originator," 'source," "inspirer," "mover," "proposer,"
"the person or thing principally responsible (for an action, situation,
etc.)," "the prime mover or agent," "initiator," "cause."169 Auctor is
the noun form of the Latin verb augere which means "[t o increase in
quantity or size, make greater, enlarge, extend, swell.""'0 The Oxford
Universal Dictionary defines "author" as " [t] he person who originates
or gives existence to anything.""' Samuel Johnson's dictionary,
which has been described as "the standard dictionary at the time
when the Constitution was framed,"12 contains four definitions for
Supp. 541, 553 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (finding that regardless of extent of contribution that each
made to it, case ofjoint proprietorship or authorship of advertising scheme for benefit ofjoint
venture, ownership inured to benefit of both with right of each to use it not only when the
relationship existed, but also afterwards).
167. Oxford Univ. Press, N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 33 C.C.PA. 11, 18-19 (1945).
168. OxFORD LATIN DIGFIoNARY 205 (1st ed. 1983).
169. Id.
170. IX. at 213. This sense of augere comports well with the understanding that an author
must add distinguishable variation in order to be considered an "author." See infra notes 198-99,
232 and accompanying text.
171. OxFoRD UNsERsAL DIcTIoNARY 797 (2d ed. 1989).
172. Arguments Before the Comm. on Patents of the Senate and House Conjointly on the Bills 8.6330
and H.R. 19853,59th Cong., 1st Sess. 212 (1906) (written statement of Nathan Burkan, Counsel,
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"author:" (1) "The first beginner or mover of any thing; he to whom
any thing owes its original;" (2) "The efficient; he that effects or
produces any thing;" (3) "The first writer of any thing; distinct from
the translator or compiler," (4) "A writer in general." 73
The Framers of the Constitution knew their Latin. Many of them
were authors in the traditional sense. An abundance of recent
scholarship has examined the veritable deification of "the author" in
the nineteenth century.74 For example, in his illuminating book,
Mark Rose meticulously recounts the concept of "author" as it evolved
through the legal and social world during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.75 According to Rose, a "literary expert wit-
ness," an author's right to profit from his work is directly linked to
the fact that he created it. "[T]he author is conceived as the
originator and therefore the owner of a special kind of commodity,
the work.... Copyright is founded on the concept of the unique
individual who creates something original and is entitled to reap a
profit from those labors." 7' Rose quotes John Locke's 1690 work,
Two Treatises of Government, as evidence that one should own the fruits
of one's own labor. 7 Rose uses the term "author" to mean "auton-
omous creator" and suggests that that is what it has come to
mean-the "modem notion."78 This is very different from the
concept of "author" revealed in Shakespeare. Rose continues,
"Normally Shakespeare's plays use 'author' in the general sense of
'source' or 'originator.'"' 79 By the early eighteenth century, some
writers began using the metaphor of the author as "father" of the
child (book). 8 Others characterized the author as a real property
owner-the tiller of the soil and his estate (book)."'
The first case that began to shape the definition of copyright
author was decided in England in 1720, Burnet v. Chetwood.82 Burnet
Music Publisher's Ass'n), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT Acr, pt.J,
at 215 (1976) [hereinafter 4 LEGISLATrVE HISTORY OF 1909 ACT].
173. SAMUELJOHNSON, A DICnONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Arno Press, N.Y. 1979)
(1755).
174. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (noting development of authors' increased
control over their works).
175. ROSE, supra note 7, at 31-142. A great deal of this section of the Article relies on Rose's
historical account.
176. ROSE, supra note 7, at 1, 2.
177. ROSE, supra note 7, at 4 (quotingJOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305-06
(1690)).
178. ROSE, supra note 7, at 25.
179. ROSE, supra note 7, at 26.
180. ROSE, supra note 7, at 38.
181. ROSE, supra note 7, at 40-41.
182. ROSE, supra note 7, at 49-50.
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involved a translation. Defendants argued that the translator was the
author of a translation from Latin into English." Although Lord
Macclesfield's decision was decidedly paternalistic,"8 the truly
interesting issue was whether
a translation [was] a new work and was a translator, therefore, an
author? Maccelsfield's opinion implied that he was inclined to
think that a translator was indeed an author, and a number of years
later in Gyles v. Wilcox (1740) a similar issue arose. Was an
abridgement of an existing book a new work, and was an abridger
an author? Lord Chancellor Hardwicke's decision was that an
abridgement-a genuine abridgement and not merely a nominal
one put together to evade the statute-was indeed a new work and
that an abridger, whose efforts required invention, learning, and
judgment, was an author. What was an author?'5
Rose does not answer this question here. Nevertheless, The Case of
Authors and Proprietors of Books, printed by booksellers in 1735 while
petitioning Parliament for a longer copyright term, explains in
fundamental property law terms, what booksellers thought an author
was in the early eighteenth century. 8' "Authors have ever had a
Property in their Works, founded upon the same fundamental
Maxims by which Property was originally settled, and hath been since
maintained."'"7 Presumably, this statement espouses the belief that
an author's claim depends upon fundamental property law precepts
such as those articulated by Locke.'8
. One important early development regarding the concept of author
occurred in "Pope v. Curl, in which the rule was established that
copyright in a letter belongs to the writer .... ",,I' This decision is
particularly important because Pope established what Rose characteriz-
es as "a transitional moment in the conception of authorship and a
pivotal moment in the production of the concept of intellectual
property."" The decision in Pope recognized the distinction
between a work, which is intangible, and the physical object in which
a work is embodied.' Thus, even this early case recognized that
183. ROSE, supra note 7, at 50.
184. RoSE, supra note 7, at 50. Lord Macclesfield said that perhaps the translator owns the
translation but the content of this book should be kept in Latin for the educated not "the
vulgar." I&
185. ROSE, supra note 7, at 51 (citation omitted).
186. ROSE, supra note 7, at 53.
187. RosE, supra note 7, at 53 (internal quotation omitted).
188. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (reiterating Locke's theory that one acquires
property by applying his labor to resources).
189. RosE, supra note 7, at 59-60.
190. ROSE, supra note 7, at 60.
191. RoSE, supra note 7, at 64-65.
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the physical object itself is not what is really important for copyright.
This understanding supports the position explained above192 that an
author need not be a fixator and that to be an author one need not
fix one's work in a physical form. 93
In the mid-eighteenth century, a number of prominent participants
in the copyright debate expressed the belief that literary authors were
somehow superior to inventors who merely fiddled around with their
hands." Rose claims that this belief was due to a class distinction,
and quotes William Blackstone, arguing the case Tonson v. Collins in
1760: "Mechanical inventions tend to the improvement of arts and
manufactures, which employ the bulk of the people .... But as to
science, the case is different. That can and ought to be, only the
employment of a few."1" 5 In the debate about what made someone
an author, Rose focuses on one scholar, Hargrave, who was unsure
"whether every writer is an author."
19 6
Pared to essentials, his argument is that since all men are distinct,
all compositions must be distinct. But Hargrave is evidently not
comfortable with a position that fails to distinguish between an
original genius and a hack writer. So he hedges, asserting only that
a literary work really original will always be distinguishable. Once
qualified in this way, Hargrave's position is transformed, for it now
appears that only some men-those blessed with at least modest
powers of original genius-can produce distinct literary works. 97
Rose summarizes his discussion about what qualifies someone as an
author by turning to Justice Holmes' observation in Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co.: "The copy is the personal reaction of an
individual upon nature. Personality always contains something
unique.... That something he may copyright."198 Rose concludes:
What stabilizes the system, however, is the continuing conviction
that though there may be exceptional cases, and though legal
192. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (noting that one can be author before actual
fixation of work).
193. Of course, fixation is necessary for copyright to exist under the 1976 Act. 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (1994).
194. RoSE, supra note 7, at 119.
195. RoSE, supra note 7, at 119 (citation omitted). Blackstone was using the word "science'
in the same way that the Constitution uses it. U.S. CONSTITUTION art. I, § 8. "Science" comes
from the Latin word scientia ("knowledge" or"understanding"). OXFORD LATIN DicTIONARY 1703
(combined ed. reprinted 1983).
196. ROSE, supra note 7, at 127.
197. ROSE, supra note 7, at 127 (internal quotation omitted).
198. ROSE, supra note 7, at 137 (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239, 299-300 (1903)). I have argued elsewhere that an author's variations are the essence of
what the Feist court called a "spark of creativity." VerSteeg, supra note 114, at 824-56. It seems
that the something which is unique can only be the author's variation, that which he adds or
changes.
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fictions [e.g. work for hire] may at times be useful, still there really
are such beings as original authors, and these gifted creatures will
express themselves in discrete works as readily distinguishable as
individual human faces."
Thus, history implies that courts in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries developed the view that authors were special intellects whose
minds generated works that reflected their personalities.
It is against this backdrop that Nathan Burkan, attorney for the
Music Publishers' Association, submitted a formal statement and a
detailed brief to Congress when it was in the process of refining the
bill that soon became the 1909 Act.2" Burkan specifically urged
that copyright protection ought to be available for phonograph re-
cords.2"' Burkan's arguments reveal that he clearly comprehended
that authors were the people who produced mental conceptions, not
merely or even necessarily tangible results. For example, in the
statement preceding his brief, he said: "the word 'writings' in the
Constitution does not mean the script of an author, but the intellectual
production of the author."0 2 Throughout his introductory state-
ments, Burkan unequivocally stated his belief that an author is the
person who engages in mental activity and that a physical product,
although it is necessary, is only secondary:
The intent was to protect his writings-that is, the subject of the
writings, the intellectual conception embodied in that writing-and
whatever form that writing may take, as long as that writing is
reduced to some tangible form, as long as the idea, the intellectual
production of the author is capable of being identified, capable of
being distinguished, then he has a right of property, entitled to
protection under that clause of the Constitution."3
199. ROSE, supra note 7, at 138. This ambiguous discussion about the mental components
of authorship really ignores the true meaning of "originality." In order to be original an author
must make an independent contribution of distinguishable variations (but the scope of
copyright protection varies [i.e., is greater or lesser] depending upon how great the variation
is, because the author's copyright only extends to that which he added or changed). It also
ignores the aspect of communication that is a necessary prerequisite to becoming an "author"
under the statute. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
200. 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1909 Acr, supra note 172, at 201-12 (statement of Nathan
Burkan, Counsel, Music Publisher's Ass'n); id. at 212-27 (written statement of Nathan Burkan,
Counsel, Music Publisher's Ass'n).
201. 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1909 ACT, supra note 172, at 203-12 (statement of Nathan
Burkan, Counsel, Music Publisher's Ass'n); id. at 212-27 (written statement of Nathan Burkan,
Counsel, Music Publisher's Ass'n).
202. 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1909 Acr, supra note 172, at 203 (statement of Nathan Burkan,
Counsel, Music Publisher's Ass'n) (emphasis added).
203. 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1909 Acr, supra note 172, at 203 (statement of Nathan Burkan,
Counsel, Music Publisher's Ass'n).
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According to Burkan, fixation is an event that may take place long
after an author's authorship has been established. "The purpose of
printing is to indicate to your senses the ideas embodied in the paper;
so in the case of perforated rolls or phonographic disks it is but
another method of conveying to the mind the ideas of the author
embodied therein." 4  Finally, in commenting on Burrow-Gi/es
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,2°5 the first Supreme Court case to define
"author,"' 6 Burkan again concentrated on the mental aspect of
what makes one an author:
In the Sarony case the court said that a photograph is entitled to
be protected, not because it is visible or invisible, but because the
photograph is representative of the intellectual conception, because
the operator exercised his ingenuity. The court said that the
operator arranged the draperies, had created the pose, and the
photograph embodied the operator's intellectual conception
07
In Burkan's brief, he quoted extensively from the British copyright
scholar, Eaton Drone, and probed the metaphysical nature of being
an author.
Indeed, so complete may be the identity of an incorporeal literary
composition that, even when it has no existence in writing or print,
it may be preserved in its entirety for ages in the memory, passing
from generation to generation, from country to country. The
composer will conceive and give expression to a musical composi-
tion without putting a note on paper. It is a creation, without
material form, in the realm of imagination; but so complete is its
incorporeal, invisible form, so marked its individuality, so distinctly
perceptible to the musical mind, that another will reproduce it 'by
ear,' without the aid of written or printed notes." 8
Burkan then quotes Drone arguing that "'the invisible, intangible,
incorporeal creation of the author's brain never loses its ideni-
204. 4 LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY 1909 AcT, supra note 172, at 208 (statement of Nathan Burkan,
Counsel, Music Publisher's Ass'n) (emphasis added).
205. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
206. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53,58 (1884) (defining "author" as
"he to whom anything owes its origin; originator, maker, one who completes a work of science
or literature").
207. 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1909 AcT, supra note 172, at 208 (statement of Nathan Burkan,
Counsel, Music Publisher's Ass'n) (emphasis added). Burkan even suggested that "in the case
of an ordinary snap shot, where the man creates no pose, where he exercises no ingenuity....
a copyright may be no protection .... " Id. at 209.
208. 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1909 AcT, supra note 172, at 217 (written statement of Nathan
Burkan, Counsel, Music Publisher's Ass'n) (quoting EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
oF PROPERTY IN INTEu.ECruAI. PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 6
(1879)).
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ty.'" 2°9  Indeed, even Drone recognized that copyright protection,
as a kind of property right, could not manifest until the moment of
physical embodiment. But that does not mean that an author is not
an author simply because he fails to embody his work in a tangible
medium of expression.210  Burkan also recognized the practical
liability of failing to embody one's work: "'When a composition has
not been reduced to writing it may be more difficult, and in some
cases impracticable, to prove the authorship and thereby to establish
a tide to ownership.' 21 1 Nevertheless, although it may have been
impractical, Burkan's observation reveals that, at least to his way of
thinking, the definition of "author" is not dependent on a work being
"reduced to writing" (i.e. embodied).
According to Burkan, the court in Sarony stated that copyrightable
subject matter subsisted in those things "by which the ideas in the
mind of the author are given visible expression."212 Thus, an author
is the one whose mind generates ideas capable of copyright protec-
tion. Burkan continued: "The court throughout this decision takes
the view that what the Constitution intended that Congress should
protect was the 'intellectual production,' the 'production of genius or
intellect,' the 'product of intellectual invention,' that which is
'representative of intellectual conception."' 213
The comments, observations, and conclusions of Rose and Burkan
illustrate plainly that the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
emphasized the intellectual/mental side of being an author. This is
important to the present discussion for two very different reasons.
First, this attention to the cerebral aspects of becoming an author
emphasizes again that fixation is not the linchpin of being an author.
It was what was going on in a person's head that made them an
author in the eighteenth and nineteenth century view. Second, it
serves as a useful point of departure for explaining the 1976 Act's
209. 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1909 ACT, supra note 172, at 217 (written statement of Nathan
Burkan, Counsel, Music Publisher's Ass'n) (quoting DRONE, INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS, supra
note 208, at 97).
210. 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1909 ACT, supra note 172, at 217 (written statement of Nathan
Burkan, Counsel, Music Publisher's Ass'n) (asserting that "'there can be no property in
thoughts, conceptions, ideas, sentiments, etc., apart from their association, is clear, for they are
then incapable of being identified or owned exclusively'" (quoting DRONE, INTELLECTUAL
PRODUCTIONS, supra note 208, at 97)).
211. 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1909 ACT, supra note 172, at 217 (written statement of Nathan
Burkan, Counsel, Music Publisher's Ass'n) (quoting DRONE, supra note 208, at 97).
212. 4 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY 1909 ACT, supra note 172, at 215 (written statement of Nathan
Burkan, Counsel, Music Publisher's Ass'n).
213. 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1909 ACT, supra note 172, at 216 (written statement of Nathan
Burkan, Counsel, Music Publisher's Ass'n) (quoting DRONE, INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS, supra
note 208, at 97) (discussing Sarony).
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understanding of "author" because the 1976 Act so clearly does not
focus on the conceptual component of authorship. A special study,
commissioned early in the process of drafting the 1976 Act, discussed
"authors" and "authorship" as set forth in case law from the 1880s to
the 1920s. 21'4 That study highlighted cases that had defined author-
ship in terms of both its mental and physical elements. One case men-
tioned in the study is the late nineteenth century English case, Nottage
v. Jackson,1 which characterized authorship as involving "originat-
ing, making, producing, as the inventive or master mind, the thing
which is to be protected, whether it be a drawing, or a painting, or a
photograph." 6 Another case from the turn of the century cited in
the study "stated that if the product would not have found existence
in the form presented but for the distinctive individuality of mind
from which it sprang, and if in makeup there is evinced some peculiar
mental endowment, there is authorship."2 17 Lastly, the study quoted
Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer Co.,218 which defined authors
as "all who exercise creative, intellectual, or aesthetic labor in the
production of a concrete tangible form.
219
The cases cited by the study, as well as Burkan's interpretations,
illustrate a transition in copyright law-a moving away from an
emphasis on the mental element toward a definition that encompasses
the act of communication via a physical element also. This transition
is reflected in the 1976 Act's insistence on communication as an
element of being an author and fixation as an element of
copyrightability.2 0  On the other hand, the 1976 Act has not
completely abandoned the conceptual component of copyrightability
and authorship, because originality is still a cornerstone require-
ment.22' Those judges and commentators who choose to accentuate
214. Copyright Law Revision: Studies Prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and
Copyrights of the Sen. Comm. on theJudiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 61-108 (1960) [hereinafter
Copyright Law Revision], reprinted in 1 OMNIBUS, supra note 6, at 61-108 (Study No. 3, The
Meaning of "Writings" in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, Nov. 1956).
215. Id, at 86, reprinted in 1 OMNIBUS, supra note 6, at 86 (citing Nottage v.Jackson, 11 Q.B.D.
627 (CA 1883)).
216. Id., reprinted in 1 OMNIBUS, supra note 6, at 86 (quoting Nottage, 11 Q.B.D. at 635).
217. I, reprinted in 1 OMNIBUS, supra note 6, at 86 (quoting National Tel. News Co. v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294, 298 (7th Cir. 1902)).
218. 31 F.2d 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1929).
219. Copyight Law Revision, supra note 214, at 86, reprinted in 1 OMNIBUS, supra note 6, at 86
(quoting Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer Co., 31 F.2d 583, 584 (E.D.N.Y. 1929)).
220. The drafters of the 1976 Act also assiduously avoided using the term "creativity" in
defining copyrightability. SeeVerSteeg, Sparks in the Tinderbox, supra note 117, at 558-72 (noting
that 1976 Act requires originality rather than creativity which would raise copyrightability bar
too high).
221. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text (noting that originality is requirement for
copyright in Constitution).
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the mental aspect of being an author are recognizing that it is
common for authors to first conceptualize their works as mental
images before they convert them into tangible form.222 Neverthe-
less, even though conceptualization is probably an antecedent activity
in the process of authorship in the majority of cases, it is not
necessarily so; and the 1976 Act recognizes that. The drafters of the
1976 Act expressly avoided mentioning "creativity" in the statute, 223
and Congress expressly rejected novelty, ingenuity, and aesthetic merit
as criteria for copyrightability.24 Instead, the drafters of the 1976
Act made communication-either direct or indirect-an essential
element of being a copyright author.
CONCLUSION
The 1976 Act grants initial copyright ownership to "authors."215
Consequently, it will frequently be vital to determine, as an issue of
fact,226 who is and who is not an "author." But, as is so often the
case with determining questions of fact, in order to get the right
answers we must ask the right questions. The 1976 Act does not
define "author" explicitly. Recent federal cases have asked the wrong
questions, placing misguided emphasis on the act of fixation as a
prerequisite for becoming an author. Yet, fundamental tenets of
copyright prevent characterizing someone who contributes only
"ideas" as an "author." These are seemingly inconsistent propositions:
(1) an author does not necessarily fix his work in a tangible medium;
but, (2) a person who contributes only intangible ideas is not an
author. Furthermore, an author need not be a "creative genius.
227
222. See supra notes 98-99, 124 (finding that originality may or may not be resulting
expression of author's mental conception).
223. See supra note 220 (discussing trend toward communication as prerequisite for
copyrightability).
224. H.R. REP. No., 1476, supra note 5, at 5664. Professor Kaplan explained the rationale
for rejecting "novelty" as a requirement for copyright:
[N]ovelty would in all events be a poor criterion. If it is a difficult, perhaps an illusory,
measure in the field of mechanical improvements, how much harder would it be in
literature or the other arts. Starting even with the bias of an extreme Romanticism,
how does one determine what is "new," or significantly or importantly new? And is it
newness, a fresh departure from the past, that we want uniquely to encourage by law?
In time a standard of novelty would have to be debased or distorted, else copyright as
a system would lose all viability.
KAPLAN, supra note 7, at 43.
225. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994).
226. S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that
"[a]uthorship is a question of fact") (citing Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc.,
820 F.2d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 1987)).
227. See supra notes 91, 197 and accompanying text (discussing position of some critics who
dispel notion of authors as creative geniuses).
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An author need not be the individual who fixes copyrightable
expression, 228 and an author cannot become an author solely by
embodying something in a tangible form.2' Fortunately, the 1976
Act itself, albeit indirectly, provides the right questions to ask to
answer the riddle. To ascertain whether someone is an author, we
must ask whether he has communicated original expression, either
directly (through personal fixation) or indirectly (through authorizing
another to fix it). That is what makes someone a copyright author.
Without communication, a person cannot be an author. Further-
more, although conceptualization generally may precede the act of
communication, it is not a compulsory antecedent to becoming an
author under the 1976 Act.
By defining "author" in this manner, the 1976 Act advances several
traditional policies of copyright. First, it promotes progress in
knowledge by encouraging those who conceptualize original expres-
sion to communicate that expression to the public, either themselves
or by engaging the services of another to do so."a For it is only
through communication that people can become authors, and it is
only by becoming authors that they can become initial owners of
copyright. Second, this definition preserves the importance of
protecting expression and not merely ideas. Copyright law has long
established that ideas should be freely accessible for the good of
humankind."' Although drawing the line between idea and expres-
sion may be difficult, draw it we must. Making the definition of
"author" depend on the demarcation of the idea/expression line
promotes the goals of copyright far better than the line of tangibili-
ty/intangibility (i.e., physical embodiment). After all, on many
occasions the difference between tangibility and intangibility easily
could be crossed by the work of a mere scribe or amanuensis. Lastly,
the requirement that an author contribute expression that is
"original" ensures that copyists will not be considered authors and
that authors must contribute distinguishable variations-variations
that are greater than merely trivial-to pre-existing works.3 2
228. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (noting that someone authorized by author
may fix author's work).
229. See supra part III.C.2 (noting that one who fixes original idea is author).
230. See Hughes, supra note 99, at 317 (making this point specifically with respect to physical
(not intellectual) property by stating that physical property only contributes to economy if owner
releases it into market or gives it away, whereas "Locke relies upon the money").
231. See generally LEAFFF.R, supra note 37, § 2.12, at 56-66 (expressing that when author
decides to disseminate his ideas to public, public may use author's ideas-author only retains
control over way his ideas are expressed).
232. See supra notes 114, 198-99 and accompanying text (finding that work must have great
deal of creativity or uniqueness); see also Chafee, supra note 10, at 512 n.19 (noting that minimal
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Although the statute does not expressly define "author" and although
commentators and judicial decisions have offered definitions with
tragic flaws,233 the 1976 Act does indirectly equip us with the tools
needed to uncover the meaning of the word "author." Like the
recent discovery of the tomb of the sons of Ramses II in the Valley of
the Kings,21 it has been there for a long time. To find it we merely
had to question erroneous assumptions made by previous scholars and
clear away debris left by others who did not look closely.2 5
level of "independent effort," such as editing, fingering, phrasing, is not recognized as
copyrightable under law). Professor Chafee, however, also stated that "Toscanini or Benny
Goodman does add enough artistic si! to another's music to deserve recognition ...."
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: II, 45 CoLUM. L. REv. 719, 734 (1945)
(emphasis added). Prof. Chafee referred to this element as "the added something." Ia
Professor Litman has identified the process of variation as the essence of authorship itself. See
Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. Prrr. L REv. 235, 244 (1991) (describing authorship as
process of changing and combining concepts and ideas in new ways); see also Hughes, supra note
99, at 353 (noting that from Holmesian perspective, authorship is, at minimum, bringing one's
subjective views to "external world").
233. See supra parts I and II (discussing various definitions of "author" established in case law
and their inadequacies in context of defining co-author). The Marshall-Goldstein definition
produces a result whereby tangibility is the litmus test, and Professor Nimmer's definition
produces a result whereby a person who generates an idea can be an author. See supra notes 14-
19 (discussing requirement of fixation of work to obtain copyright protection); supra notes 62-69
and accompanying text (setting forth Nimmer's de minimis approach to definition of
authorship).
234. See Larry Reibstein & Susan Miller, The Tomb of Brothers, NEWSWEEK, May 29, 1995, at 66
(noting that, until February 1995, mausoleum remained undiscovered for 3200 years, although
several archaeologists had come close to finding tomb);John Noble Wilford, Tomb of Ramses 11's
Many Sons Is Found in Egypt N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1995, at Al (describing discovery of largest
tomb built in 1600 B.C. in Valley of Kings).
235. Apparently more than one archaeologist has found the entrance to this magnificent
tomb. Reibstein & Miller, supra note 234, at 66-67. They, however, relying on the work of prior
scholars, erroneously determined that it was insignificant. Id. Howard Carter, the famous
British archaeologist and explorer who discovered King Tutankhamen's tomb in 1922, actually
used the entrance to the tomb of Ramses II's sons as a spot to discard the detritus from his
excavation of the famous tomb of King Tutankhamen. Id. at 66.
